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Silverstein: From Statute to Contract: The Law of the Employment Relationship

FROM STATUTE TO CONTRACT: THE LAW OF
THE EMPLOYMENT RELATIONSHIP
RECONSIDERED
Eileen Silverstein*
Most observers would say that the employment relationship is
regulated largely by statutes. Personnel decisions must comply with the
nondiscrimination and accommodation mandates of federal laws like
Title VII,' the ADEA, 2 the ADA,3 the FMLA, 4 and their state
counterparts. Pay equity between the sexes is explicitly required by the
EPA,5 while the FLSA6 establishes minimum wages and prescribes the
circumstances under which employees are compensated for working
overtime. Conditions at the workplace that implicate health and safety
are subject to OSHA 7 standards. Pension benefit plans are closely
regulated by ERISA, and ERISA's preemption provision appears to oust
common law oversight of welfare benefit plans. 9 Even the judiciallycreated case law eroding employment-at-will is finding expression in
statutes such as the Montana Wrongful Discharge From Employment

Zephaniah Swift Professor of Law, University of Connecticut. A summer research
grant
from the University of Connecticut School of Law supported this'project. Thanks to Alan Ritter for
critical readings of the text and to Marsha Lawson and Michael McKenna for research assistance.
1. Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1994 & Supp. IV
1999) (amended 1999). The familiarity of these statutes allows me to refer to them by their common
acronyms in the text and to relegate full titles, like citations, to the footnotes.
2. The Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1994 &
Supp. IV 1999).
3. The Americans With Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (1994 & Supp.
IV 1999).
4. The Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2654 (1994 & Supp. IV
1999).
5. The Equal Pay Act of 1963,29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (1994).
6. The Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-19 (1994 & Supp. IV 1999)
(amended 1999).
7. The Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970,29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (1994).
8. The Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1994).
ERISA applies to tax-qualified pension plans in the private sector only.
9. See 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a)(1994).
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Act, ' the New Jersey Conscientious Employee Protection Act," and the

ABA's Model Employment Termination Act.2
These statutes that regulate aspects of the employment relationship
are premised on the failure of the market to produce outcomes that
correspond to social preferences and ideas about the treatment of
different groups. Congressional declarations assert that "wage
differentials based on sex" depress income, to the detriment of workers'
health and efficiency, and prevent maximum utilization of available
labor resources;' 4 that "arbitrary age limits regardless of potential for job
performance" disadvantage older workers in their efforts to retain or
regain employment; 15 that "the continuing existence of unfair and
unnecessary discrimination and prejudice" denies people with
disabilities employment opportunities;' 6 that "[v]ast resources that could
be available for productive use are siphoned off to pay workmen's
compensation benefits and medical expenses;"' 7 that "many employees

with long years of employment [lose] anticipated retirement benefits"
because of the absence of vesting provisions and inadequate funding of

pension plans;'" and that "the lack of employment policies to
accommodate working parents" may force a choice between job security
and parenting.'9
10. MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 39-2-901 to -915 (2000). Montana enacted this law against the
background of significant plaintiffs' awards in suits at common law. See, e.g., Flanigan v.
Prudential Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 720 P.2d 257 (Mont. 1986). Other states may be expected to
follow if, as suggested by industrial psychologist James C. Scharf, common law tort, not statutory
employment claims, made up over half of all employment claims between 1989 and 1995. See
James C. Scharf, Proceedingsof'the 1999 Annual Meeting, Association of American Law Schools
Section on Employment DiscriminationLaw: Is There a Disconnect Between EEO Law and the
Workplace?, 3 EMPLOYEE RTs. & EMP. POL'Y J. 131, 135 (1999). Scharf attributes the popularity of
tort claims to the availability of uncapped awards for compensatory and punitive relief. See id.
11. N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 34:19-1 to -8 (1986).
12. National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws 1991, MODEL
EMPLOYMENT TERMINATION Acr §§ 1-14, 7A U.L.A. 421,421-48(1991).
13. See, e.g., Barrentine v. Ark.-Best Freight Sys., 450 U.S. 728, 735 (1981) (stating that
labor and employment laws are "[piredicated on the assumption that individual workers have little,
if any, bargaining power"). See also the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), 29 U.S.C. § 151
(1994) ("The inequality of bargaining power between employees who do not possess full freedom
of association or actual liberty of contract, and employers who are organized in the corporate or
other forms of ownership association substantially burdens and affects the flow of commerce ....
"),
The NLRA also protects individuals from adverse employment decisions motivated by union
animus. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 158(a) (1), 158(a) (3) & 158(b) (1) (A).
14. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d).
15. 29 U.S.C. § 621.
16. 42 U.S.C. § 12101.
17. S.REP. No. 1282 (1970); see also 29 U.S.C. § 651.
18. 29 U.S.C. §1001(a).
19. 29 U.S.C. §2601(a) (3).
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Having identified the market failure, each statute provides an
enforcement scheme which will enable individuals and government
agencies to, in the words of the Equal Pay Act, "correct and...
eliminate the conditions above referred to . .. ,20 by, for example,
promoting employment on the basis of ability rather than age or race or
gender;21 by providing places of employment "free from recognized
hazards that are causing or likely to cause death or serious physical harm
to... employees";2 and by assuring the soundness of pensions "for the
protection of the revenue of the United States, and to provide for the free
flow of commerce .... "23
Unsurprisingly, the rights recognized by these statutes are routinely
described as both private and public ones, established for the benefit of
individuals and society as a whole. In one of the first decisions
interpreting Title VII, the Supreme Court instructed that federal court
relief not only compensates the victims of discrimination but vindicates
the broader public interest in deterring future discrimination.24 Also,
unsurprisingly, the remedial schemes of these statutes correspond to the
dual nature of the rights, authorizing compensation to make individuals
whole,'5 including attorneys fees for prevailing plaintiffs, 26 while also
making injunctive relief presumptively appropriate, 2 thus reinforcing the
prophylactic or deterrent purpose of the legislation. As emphasized by
the Supreme Court as recently as in 1998, the "primary objective" of
20. 29 U.S.C. § 202(b).
21. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634; 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17.
22. 29 U.S.C. § 654(a) (1).
23. 29 U.S.C. § 1001.
24. See Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 417, 421 (1975) (citing Griggs v. Duke
Power Co., 401 U.S. 424,429-30 (1971)):
[Tihe primary objective was a prophylactic one: "It was to achieve equality of
employment opportunities and remove barriers that have operated in the past to favor an
identifiable group of white employees over other employees ... " If employers faced
only the prospect of an injunctive order, they would have little incentive to shun
practices of dubious legality.... [B]ackpay should be denied only for reasons which, if
applied generally, would not frustrate the central statutory purposes of eradicating
discrimination throughout the economy and making persons whole for injuries suffered
through past discrimination.
Albenarle,422 U.S. at 421.
25. See id. at 421.
26. See Newman v. Piggie Park Enters., 390 U.S. 400, 402 (1968) (Congress authorized
individuals injured by racial discrimination to be awarded attorney's fees because they are acting as
"'private attorney[s] general' vindicating a policy that Congress considered of the highest priority");
see also Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412, 420-22 (1978) (prevailing plaintiffs
routinely receive attorney's fees while prevailing defendants receive them only if the plaintiff's
claim was frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation).
27. See Newman, 390 U.S. at 402.
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statutes, like Title VII, that are meant "to influence primary conduct, is
not to provide redress but to avoid harm." '
However, and remarkably, the statutory regulation of the
employment relationship, and its correction of market failures, is
disappearing under the cloak of judicial decisions upholding contracts
which, in one form or another, find individuals to have waived their and
the public's statutory rights. 9 In a variation on the nineteenth century's
transformation of the employment relationship from status to contract, 3
we have the contemporary move from statute to contract.
This Article challenges the return to contract in the regulation of the
employment relationship on two related but independent grounds. First, I
contend that contractual waivers both annul the "primary objective" of
avoiding harm established by employment statutes and invite the very
conduct these laws were designed to stop. Second, I argue that the
standard for testing the legality of waivers, 'whether they are entered into
"knowingly and voluntarily," misconstrues the circumstances under
which employees make a meaningful choice to accept the terms of
employment contracts.
Part I of this Article examines how contractual waivers operate
within the framework of the statutory regulation of the employment
relationship: Employers removeffuture disputes from statutory regulation
by requiring applicants for employment and incumbent employees to
agree, as the price of securing or retaining a job, to have all
employment-related disagreements, including alleged violations of
statutory rights, decided by arbitration rather than litigation.3 Employers
insulate currentand prioremployment decisions from legal challenge by
requiring employees to release all claims, including those based on
statute, as the price of receiving enhanced benefits." In both of these
circumstances, an individual who has not challenged an employment
practice or personnel decision agrees to forego statutory rights whose
significance may not yet be appreciated, in order to secure something of
immediate value, like a job or a benefit.3 I call these agreements
28. Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 806 (1998).
29. See discussion infra Section II. These waivers also preclude assertion of common law
claims.
30. See generallySIR HENRY MAINE, ANCIENT LAW (1861).
31. See discussion infra Section II.B.
32. See discussion infra Section I.A.
33. Unlike this Article, the literature tends to focus on either contractual clauses that
substitute arbitration for litigation as the forum for disposing of statutory claims or clauses that
condition benefits on the waiver of accrued statutory claims. Among the best articles are: David S.
Schwartz, Enforcing Small Print To Protect Big Business: Employee and Consumer Rights Clains
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waivers-for-private-gain.
Part II addresses the question of whether the move from statute to
contract is a cause for concern. Many would answer no because allowing
the waiver of statutory claims empowers workers to decide for
themselves the value of these rights. For example, a female employee
earning $30,000 a year may suspect that gender played a role in the
employer's decision to eliminate her job by combining it with that of her
retained male colleague; but rather than litigate the matter she might
prefer to accept the employer's offer of $100,000 in severance pay
conditioned on a release of accrued but as yet unchallenged legal claims.
Indeed, one could argue that the statutory entitlement of a workplace in
which gender does not play a decisive role in employment decisions has
created a background legal rule that prompts compensation of employees
when employers either indulge their unlawful preferences or try to shield
themselves from litigation over economically-motivated personnel
decisions. And one law, the ADEA, explicitly authorizes waivers-forprivate-gain as long as they are "knowing and voluntary" 4 in the sense
of meeting minimal procedural safeguards.
On the other hand, the statutes regulating the employment
relationship do not authorize the courts to compromise the goals of
compliance and compensation by applying contract principles which are
designed for the quite different purpose of resolving private, commercial
disputes.35 Nor have the conditions which animated the Congressional
legislation vanished or been substantially ameliorated. Not a single
employment-related law has been repealed; indeed, one could argue that
the accumulation of rights-based legislation demonstrates Congress'
(and the state legislatures') awareness of continuing failures in the labor
in An Age Of Compelled Arbitration, 1997 Wis. L. REV. 33 (discussing prospective waiver of fora);
Joseph R. Grodin, Arbitration of Employment Discrimination Claims: Doctrine and Policy in the
Wake of Gilmer, 14 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMp. L.J. 1 (1996) (discussing prospective waiver of fora in
employment disputes); Katherine Van Wezel Stone, Mandatory Arbitration of Individual
Employment Rights: The Yellow Dog Contract of the 1990s, 73 DENv,!. U. L. Rv. 1017 (1996)
(discussing prospective waiver of fora); Alfred W. Blumrosen et al., Downsizing and Employee
Rights, 50 RuTGERS L. REv. 943 (1998) (discussing prospective waiver of accrued claims); Michael
C. Harper, Age-Based Exit Incentives, Coercion, and the Prospective Waiver of ADEA Rights: The
Failure of the Older Workers Benefit Protection Act, 79 VA. L. REV. 1271 (1993) (discussing
prospective waiver of accrued claims).
34. 29 U.S.C. § 626(0 (1) (1994); see also infra notes 60-65 and accompanying text.
35. See, e.g., Oubre v. Entergy Operations, Inc., 522 U.S. 422 (1998) (holding that the Older
Worker Benefit Protection Act (OWBPA), codified at 29 U.S.C. § 626(f), not common law rules of
legitimacy, ratification and tender back, establishes ground rules for knowing and voluntary waiver
under ADEA). For a discussion of Oubre and its effects, see Jan W. Henkel, Waiver of Claims
Under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act After Oubre v. Entergy Operations, Inc., 35
WAKE FOREST L. REv. 395 (2000).
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market.36
Having discussed the operation and impact of waivers-for-privategain, I proceed in Part II of the Article to examine the criteria for
allowing these private agreements as long as they meet some type of
"knowing and voluntary" waiver of statutory rights. Although the courts
in applying the various statutes use somewhat different terms and
standards in describing a "knowing and voluntary" waiver, the core,
shared concept is procedural regularity.31 For example, courts enforce
agreements to arbitrate, rather than litigate, future employment disputes
as long as there is some evidence in the record that the employee could
have been alerted to the promise that an arbitrator would resolve future
disputes at the workplace." And judges satisfy themselves that waivers
of the right to challenge past and present employment practices in
exchange for enhanced benefits are "knowing and voluntary" by
insisting on strict compliance with requirements that an individual
receive adequate information and sufficient time to consider the
proposed trade-off, so that evidence of compliance with a legal
requirement of 21 days to consider a waiver of claims is evidence of
both knowledge (time to consider) and voluntariness (time to consider
without feeling coerced).39 Thus, the law denies the concept of
voluntariness any independent meaning, and, as I argue in Part III,
ignores the rich philosophical literature on voluntariness and its
counterpoint coercion. Part III concludes that only a fully realized
conception of voluntariness provides a legitimate baseline for examining
the authenticity of contractual waivers of statutory rights in the
employment relationship.
I. WAIVERS-FOR-PRIVATE-GAIN AND WAIVERS-BY-SET7LEMENT
COMPARED

The use of waivers-for-private-gain, whether to foreclose litigation
of present or past statutory claims or to substitute arbitration for
36. I do not address the Supreme Court's current rewriting of the Constitution because, in
theory at least, state legislatures have the power to replicate the federal legislation being judicially
repealed by the Court's new federalism. See, e.g., Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000);
United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
37. See generally Thiele v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 59 F. Supp. 2d 1060,
1062-65 (S.D. Cal. 1999); Hall v. Metlife Res., 1995 U.S. Dist LEXIS 5812 (S.D.N.Y. 1995).
38. See Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991); infra note 98 and
accompanying text.
39. See Oubre, 522 U.S. at424.
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adjudication of future claims of statutory violations, rests to a large
extent on an analogy with ending civil litigation through settlement
rather than by trial. The rationale is that waivers-for-private-gain
function in a manner similar to waivers-by-settlement.0
The analogy does not appear in the statutes themselves. When
enacting laws like Title VII and the ADEA, Congress focused on
defining the nature of the newly-recognized rights and on the means for
enforcement; 4' there is no reference to the possibility of, or the
conditions under which, beneficiaries of the legislation could contract
out of the statutes' provisions. Indeed, at the time Congress was enacting
laws to regulate employment relations, the raison d'etre for government
intervention was dissatisfaction with practices in the workplace, whether
established through arms-length negotiation or set by employers and at
least tacitly agreed to by employees. 42 During this period as well, judges
dismissed the arbitral forum as inadequate. 43 It was simply unimaginable
that the enactment of complex statutory regimes designed to give
judicial protection to workers who "have little, if any, bargaining
power'" could be supplanted by private agreement.
Although it could be argued that Congressional silence on the use
of contractual waivers signaled Congressional expectation that statutory
rights could never be compromised through contract, even through
settlement, 45 this argument proves too much. Congress authorized
lawsuits by individuals, thus recognizing that compliance pursuant to
agency initiatives alone could not bring about a rapid transformation in
employment practices. 6 To enable employees to secure legal
representation, in most circumstances the legislation provides for fee40. See generally Marc Galanter & Mia Cahill, "Most Cases Settle": JudicialPromotion and
Regulation of Settlements, 46 STAN. L. REv. 1339 (1994) (discussing settlements and adjudication).
41. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 88-872 (1964) (giving the legislative history of Title VII).
42. See, e.g., id.
43. The exception to this judicial hostility was in labor-management disputes where the
parties, as part of a negotiation about terms and conditions at the workplace, agreed to final, binding
arbitration as the means to settle disputes arising under a collective bargaining agreement. See
United States v. Am. Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960); United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf
Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960).
44. Barrentine v. Ark.-Best Freight Sys., Inc., 450 U.S. 728, 735 (1981). But cf.29 U.S.C. §
151 (providing that in order to remedy unequal bargaining power, the NLRA authorizes collective
bargaining so that employees through their unions can participate in setting the rules at the
workplace).
45. In the 1960s and the 1970s the case law did not allow waivers of statutory rights by
employees. See discussion infra Section II.B.
46. Recent figures only underline the significance of private enforcement. See Scharf, supra
note 10, at 137 (stating that the EEOC was a party to less than one-quarter of one percent of
employment litigation).
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shifting.47 Having opened the courthouse doors to individual litigation, it
is highly unlikely that Congress by its silence intended private litigants
in statutory employment cases to have fewer tactical options than

litigants in other civil disputes. Indeed, the inference could be drawn
instead that Congress anticipated waivers-by-settlement, by authorizing
the administrative agencies charged with enforcement to engage in

conciliation and to negotiate conciliation agreements. 48 But are the
prospective waivers of statutory rights in exchange for a job or enhanced

benefits similar enough to waivers-by-settlement for us to infer implicit
Congressional acceptance of waivers-for-private-gain? The contexts
appear significantly different in relevant ways.
In waivers-by-settlement, attorneys negotiate terms that will put an
end to the legal dispute between a person who has already filed a
complaint or administrative charge and the employer against whom the
claims are lodged. Typically, the complainant accepts a sum of money in
exchange for dropping the pending claims and taking a vow of
confidentiality.49 Sometimes the employer may agree to ameliorative
steps related to the underlying complaint that will benefit the remaining

workforce, such as training supervisors to combat sexual harassment or
adapting criteria for promotions that take into account a group's distinct
and previously undervalued talents.50 Less frequently, the complaining
employee also returns to the workplace under negotiated conditions that
address the alleged violations.

Ending disputes through settlement rather than litigation is
characteristic of most civil litigation, since without the possibility of
settlement lawyers and potential plaintiffs might be deterred from

challenging unlawful

practices.5' Although

problematic

in the

47. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k); see also H. REP. No. 94-1558, at 1 (1976); H. REP. No.
102-40(1) (1991) (restoring "the efficacy of Title VIl's fee-shifting provision in order to accomplish
Title Vl's goals").
48. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C.§ 2000(e)-5(b) (Title VII); 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (ADEA). This inference
is bolstered by Congress' explicit and repeated rejection of an EEOC plan to permit private
litigation to proceed to settlement without EEOC oversight. See Blumrosen, supra note 33, at 979
n.1 11 (for discussion and citations).
49. See generally Lynn M. LoPucki & Walter 0. Weyrauch, A Theory of Legal Strategy, 49
DuKE L.J. 1405, 1469 (2000) (discussing the settlement process).
50. See generally Galanter & Cahill, supra note 40, at 1359-60 (discussing how settlement
can be more responsive to parties' needs and more "accommodating [to] nonmonetary claims").
51. But see Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073, 1085 (1984) (stating that
settlement trivializes the remedial dimension of a lawsuit and reduces the social function of a
lawsuit to one of resolving private disputes); Galanter & Cahill, supra note 40, at 1351-78
(questioning the arguments in favor of settlement and arguing for a rigorous examination of the
quality of settlements); LoPucki, supra note 49, at 1469 (stating that settlement strategies can
generate outcomes that "lie entirely outside the range of possible outcomes from litigation").
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employment context, because they tend to privatize public rights,
waivers-by-settlement are accepted as a cost of promoting compliance
with remedial statutes.5 2 And, as is common with settlements in other
areas of the law, waiver of the right to continue to sue over alleged past
unlawful employment practices is judged acceptable, in part, because at
the time of the waiver the complainant has had an opportunity to identify
and analyze the wrong done to her, to assess the damage and calculate
the money needed to speed recovery, and to trade some private benefit in
the form of adjusted compensation for some public benefit in the form of
employer obligations to the remaining work force. 3 Thus, though less
than perfect, waivers-by-settlement tend to promote compliance and
compensation, the twin goals of statutory regulation at the workplace. 4

In contrast, when employers condition jobs or enhanced benefits on
waiving statutory rights, be they the right to have a jury assess future

claims or the right to challenge current and past employment practices,
applicants and employees are asked to anticipate conflicts that may not
yet have occurred and to evaluate workplace practices in light of

technical, perhaps unknown, standards.5 5 Securing an immediate benefit
in exchange for giving up the unknown in a circumstance where
employee and employer have asymmetrical information bears little
resemblance to the environment in which waivers-by-settlement occur.56
52. In practice, few settlements acceptable to the complaining party will be rejected. For
examples of the EEOC's recognition that settlement is part of the litigation process in Title VII,
ADEA and ADA disputes, see 1 EEOC Compl. Man. (CCH) 556(2) ("In exchange for satisfactory
fulfillment by respondent of the promises contained in paragraph (3) of this Agreement, the
charging party agrees not to institute a lawsuit with respect to the above referenced charge.").
53. See discussion infra Section II.A. I also include in the category of waiver by settlement,
dispute-ending agreements negotiated by the parties (and their attorneys) prior to the formal filing
of a complaint or administrative charge, but following notice to the employer of the complainant's
intent to initiate legal proceedings. The problem of incomplete information at this stage is balanced
by the sophistication of the attorneys who practice employment law and are able to assess the value
of a case.
54. See McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publ'g Co., 513 U.S. 352, 358 (1995). "[The private
litigant who seeks redress for his or her injuries vindicates both the deterrence and compensation
objectives of [the anti-discrimination statutes]." Id. at 358. In addition, the administrative agency
charged with enforcing the remedial statute may have the authority or be required to supervise the
settlement process or review the settlement, thus protecting the public interest. Cf Brooklyn Say.
Bank v. O'Neil, 324 U.S. 697, 704-08 (1945) (analyzing the FLSA).
55. ERISA in particular presents formidable and complex issues concerning information,
which I do not address. See generally Lorraine A. Schmall, Keeping Employer Promises When
RelationalIncentives No Longer Pertain: "RightSizing" and Employee Benefits, 68 GEo. WASH. L.
REV. 276 (2000) (discussing the passage of ERISA and its effects).
56. Pauline Kim's intriguing empirical studies suggest that employees' perceptions of their
legal protections are inaccurate and that information and experience do not routinely change those
perceptions. See Pauline T. Kim, Norms, Learningand Law: Exploring the Influences On Workers'
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To the extent that waivers-for-private-gain are enforced, employees may
compromise not only their rights but those of the public as well."

Indeed, and perversely, waivers-for-private-gain may invite employers
to ignore statutory requirements by reducing the risk of complete

remedial relief or of any challenge at all."3 Thus, with waivers-forprivate-gain employers contract around or out of statutory obligations
before the ripening of any claim, while in waivers-by-settlement
employers merely reduce the cost of resolving already-identified
challenges to violations of statutory rights. Given these differences,
Congressional acceptance of waivers-by-settlement in no way implicates
Congressional approval of waivers-for-private-gain.
This analysis is confirmed by reference to the one contemporary
circumstance in which Congress has explicitly approved waivers of
statutory rights in the employment context. The Older Workers Benefit
Protection Act of 1990 (OWBPA), an amendment to the ADEA,"9
authorizes waivers of past and present statutory rights in exchange for
enhanced benefits, but only if employees have been alerted to the nature
of the claims being released and have had the opportunity to consult a
lawyer6 The OWBPA was prompted by the widespread practice of
Legal Knowledge, 1999 U. ILL. L. REv. 447; Pauline T. Kim, Bargaining With Imperfect
Information:A Study of Worker Perceptions of Legal Protectionin an At-Will World, 83 CORNELL
L. REv. 105 (1997).
57. See Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Nixon, 210 F.3d 814, 818 (8th Cir.)
(providing that a public agency may pursue claims for injunctive relief only despite claimant's loss
at arbitration of Title VII termination claim), cert. denied, 121 S. Ct. 383 (2000); EEOC v. Kidder,
Peabody & Co., Inc., 156 F.3d 298, 300-01 (2d Cir. 1998) (stating that the EEOC is compelled to
arbitrate actions it brings on behalf of individual plaintiffs who have prospectively waived the right
to ajudicial forum). But cf. EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc., 193 F.3d 805, 812-13 (4th Cir. 1999), cert.
granted, 121 S. Ct. 1401 (2001); EEOC v. Frank's Nursery & Crafts, Inc., 177 F.3d 448 (6th Cir.
1998); EEOC v. Johnson & Higgins, Inc., 91 F.3d 1529, 1536 (2d Cir. 1996) (stating that the EEOC
retains the right to litigate in the public interest despite waiver by individual claimant).
58. Or, in the words of several commentators, employers purchase "a license to
discriminate ....
Richard J. Lussier, Title 1H of the Older Workers Benefit Protection Act: A
Licensefor Age Discrimination?The Problem Identified and ProposedSolutions, 35 HARV. J. ON
LEGtS. 189, 194 (1998); see also Blumrosen, supra note 33, at 1011; Harper, supra note 33, at
1294-98. This contractual move is not limited to the employment context. See, e.g., LAVRENCE
LEsSIG, CODE AND OTHER LAWs OF CYBERSPACE (1999); G. Richard Shell, Contracts in the
Modern Supreme Court, 81 CAL. L. REV. 433, 527 (1993) (noting that the modem Supreme Court
approves strict and literal enforcement of adhesion contracts in virtually every case). Compare
Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Randolph, 121 S. Ct. 513, 516 (2000) (holding an arbitration provision
which is silent on costs and fees enforceable in a case involving the Truth in Lending Act, unless
party seeking to invalidate arbitration provision proves the procedure would be prohibitively
expensive) with Goodman v. ESPE Am., Inc., 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 433, at *13, 84 Fair Empl.
Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1629 (E.D. Pa. 2001) (holding the same under Title VII).
59. 29 U.S.C. § 626(0 (1994).
60. Although prompted by waivers offered in exchange for enhanced benefits on termination,
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employers conditioning severance benefits on the signing of agreements
to forego any legal claims arising from the about-to-be-terminated
employment relationship. 6' To insure that departing employees have
adequate information to assess their choices, Congress mandated that a
waiver, whether offered to an individual or a group, "may not be

considered knowing and voluntary unless at a minimum ' 62 it (1) is in
understandable language, (2) specifically refers to ADEA fights and
claims, (3) does not include claims arising after the date of the
document, (4) is supported by adequate consideration, (5) advises the
employee to consult an attorney, (6) gives the employee at least 21 days
(and in the case of group incentives 45 days) to consider the offer (and in
the case of a group incentive provides employees with the program's
eligibility criteria, time limits, and data regarding job titles and ages of
those not selected as well as those eligible), and (7) provides a seven-day

revocation period. 63 So the most that can be said regarding Congressional
approval of waivers-for-private-gain is that, in the one instance where
Congress addressed them, 6' it established an elaborate set of
nothing in the language of OWBPA limits its application to the context of termination. See, e.g.,
Thiele v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 59 F. Supp. 2d 1060, 1064-65 (S.D. Cal. 1999)
(holding that, by its language, the OWBPA applies to agreements to arbitrate any type of age
discrimination dispute made after enactment of OWBPA and that trial by jury is statutorily
guaranteed). But cf.Williams v. Cigna Fin. Advisors, Inc., 56 F.3d 656, 660-61 (5th Cir. 1995)
(holding the OWBPA applicable to separation agreements only despite the absence of limiting
language in the Act). See also Kulling v. Grinders for Indus., Inc., 115 F. Supp. 2d 828, 850-51
(E.D. Mich. 2000) (holding that a state tort action for wrongful death by widow of an employee who
committed suicide after being laid-off was not pre-empted by ADEA but was precluded because
employee signed release in exchange for $17,138 in severance pay); Friz v. J&H Marsh &
McLennan, Inc., 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 869 (4th Cir. 2001) (holding that a failure to sign a release
and a waiver that would prohibit solicitation of business from employer's associates bars
entitlement to enhanced severance benefits).
61. Prior to the OWBPA, courts permitted these waivers-for-private-gain under all of the
employment statutes as long as they were "voluntary and knowing" under all the circumstances.
Following passage of the OWBPA, courts continue to speak of "voluntary and knowing" waivers of
statutory rights, sometimes using the OWBPA requirements even though that Act applies only to
age discrimination claims, sometimes rely on the totality of the circumstances test. See infra note
67.
62. 29 U.S.C. § 626(f) (1).
63. See 29 U.S.C. § 626(f) (1) (A)-(G).
64. The 1991 Civil Rights Act expresses Congressional approval of alternative dispute
resolution "to the extent appropriate and authorized by law." Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No.
102-166, § 118, 105 Stat. 1071, 1081 (1991). The Civil Rights Act invalidated four Supreme Court
decisions from the 1989 term which had significantly altered existing interpretations of Title VII,
none of which involved waivers-for-private-gain. Indeed, at the time of initial passage in 1990,
federal courts assumed that neither an agreement to arbitrate a Title VII claim nor an adverse
arbitral ruling could act as a waiver of the right to proceed with that same claim in court; President
Bush refused to sign the Act in 1990. After the 1991 version of the Act was drafted and committee
reports were issued, but before fmal passage, the Supreme Court issued its decision in Gilmer v.
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requirements to reduce concerns about asymmetrical knowledge and to
improve employees' opportunities to secure timely, informed advice
regarding known or knowable claims. 6'

Of course, the minima specified by Congress for a "voluntary and
knowing" waiver are procedural in nature. On further reflection one may
conclude that the procedural protections are inadequate to the task for
which they are intended. However, at this point my only concern is to
demonstrate that nothing in the legislation regulating the employment

relationship supports the analogy between waivers-by-settlement and
waivers-for-private-gain.
II. THE LAW OF WAIVERS-FOR-PRIVATE-GAIN
This section explores the ways in which waivers-for-private-gain
defeat rather than accomplish the statutory goals of the employment

laws, commenting first on agreements to waive accrued statutory claims
and then on agreements to arbitrate future statutory claims. Crucial to

this discussion is recognition of the law's reliance on procedural
regularity in lieu of an inquiry into the substantive fairness of contractual
waivers.
A. Waivers-for-Private-GainI: Agreeing Not to Challenge Present and
Past Claims of Statutory Violations
In the introduction to this Article I emphasized the significance to
employees' well-being of statutory rights at the workplace, but offered
the hypothetical situation in which a female employee foregoes the

opportunity to challenge her arguably gendered dismissal in exchange
InterstatelJohnsonLane Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991), which enforced a compelled arbitration clause
against a securities broker who had accepted it as a condition of employment, but who later sought
to litigate an ADEA claim in federal court. Although Gilmer involved enforcement of rights under
the ADEA, most federal courts have assumed that the Supreme Court's approval of mandatory, predispute waiver applies to other federal employment laws. See infra, note 98 and accompanying text.
65. It appears that the OWBPA applies solely to age discrimination claims because supporters
feared tying the fate of the OWBPA to the uncertain success of attempts to invalidate the four
Supreme Court decisions involving Title VII. See Blumrosen, supra note 33, at 984 n.124. Some
courts of appeals stress that the OWBPA establishes minimal requirements and allow inquiry into
whether nonstatutory circumstances, such as fraud, duress or coercion, render otherwise valid
waivers void. See Bennett v. Coors Brewing Co., 189 F.3d 1221, 1229 (10th Cir. 1999); Griffin v.
Kraft Gen. Foods, Inc., 62 F.3d 368, 373-74 (11th Cir. 1995). These decisions are questionable in
light of Oubre v. Entergy Operations,Inc., 522 U.S. 422, 426-27 (1998) (rejecting common law
tender back doctrine to ratification of otherwise invalid OWBPA waivers because OWBPA
supplants the common law with reference to waivers under ADEA).
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for three times her annual salary.' Why might she make that choice?
Probably due to uncertainty. At the time of electing the guaranteed
compensation she does not have enough information to evaluate whether
the termination is in fact tainted in a way prohibited by statute. 6
66. See supra Section II. In an alternative scenario, she is among a pool of employees who
have been offered the option of leaving with enhanced benefits or risking termination, in a
circumstance in which the employer has made clear its intention to reduce costs by reducing the
number of employees. Having been targeted as expendable, it makes more sense for the employee to
accept the buy-out rather than gamble on continued employment.
67. Although the requirements of the OWBPA apply only to waivers of present and past
ADEA claims, courts closely scrutinize waivers of substantive rights under other employment laws.
Some courts have used the OWBPA standard to test the legality of waivers-for-private-gain under
other employment laws, reasoning that, if asked, Congress would want any compromise of statutory
rights at the workplace to occur only after the employee secured adequate information and advice.
See Rangel v. El Paso Nat. Gas Co., 996 F. Supp. 1093, 1096-99 (D.N.M. 1998) (applying the no
tender back rule mandated by the OWBPA to claims of national origin discrimination under Title
VII). See also Blumrosen, supranote 33, at 1019-20 (endorsing the use of ADEA/OWBPA criteria
in determining whether waivers of accrued claims of Title VII violations, and of all statutes
enforced by the EEOC, are voluntary and knowing). However, the majority of the courts addressing
the issue have taken the position that waivers of the right to litigate non-ADEA statutory claims
need not comply with the OWBPA requirements. These courts ask instead whether the "totality of
the circumstances" evidences a "knowing and voluntary" waiver of present or past statutory
violations. See Vital v. Interfaith Med. Ctr., 168 F.3d 615, 622 (2d Cir. 1999) (holding a waiver of
Title VII claims was a knowing and voluntary release when examined in light of the totality of the
circumstances); Puentes v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 86 F.3d 196, 198 (11th Cir. 1996); Webb v.
Merck & Co., 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7742, 80 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 59 (E.D. Pa. May 20,
1999) (common law doctrine that fraud, accident, or deceit vitiates effect of releases applicable to
claims arising under 42 U.S.C. § 1981, Title VII and state fair employment practices law); Laramee
v. Jewish Guild for the Blind, 72 F. Supp. 2d 357, 359 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (holding that the totality of
circumstances, not OWBPA criteria, should be used to evaluate validity of waiver of claims of
violations of ADA, Title VII and state human rights law). The "totality of the circumstances" test
examines: (1)the plaintiff's education and business experience; (2) the amount of time the plaintiff
considered the agreement before signing; (3) the plaintiff's opportunity to consult with a lawyer; (4)
the employer's encouragement or discouragement of consultation with an attorney; and (5) the
consideration for the waiver when compared with benefits to which the employee was already
entitled. See id. at 360. Thus, the "totality of the circumstances" inquiry provides less assurance that
waivers of accrued statutory rights are based on accurate relevant information, and leads to the odd
result that the same waiver may be found "voluntary and knowing" as to some claims of
employment discrimination but not others. For example, in Tung v. Texaco, Inc.,150 F.3d 206 (2d
Cir. 1998), the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held a release of legal claims in exchange
for enhanced benefits on termination "voluntary and knowing" as to Title VII claims of race and
national origin discrimination, using the "totality of the circumstances" test, but not "voluntary and
knowing" as to ADEA claims, because the employer did not timely supply OWBPA-required
information on the ages of the other employees involved in the same group termination program.
See id. at 208-09; see also Am. Airlines, Inc. v. Cardoza-Rodriguez, 133 F.3d 111 (1st Cir. 1998)
(holding waivers invalid for ADEA claims and remanding on the issue of the validity of waivers on
non-ADEA claims); Long v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 105 F.3d 1529, 1545 (3rd Cir. 1997); Raczak v.
Ameritech Corp., 103 F.3d 1257, 1268 (6th Cir. 1997) (holding a general release valid, except for
claims relating to age discrimination, and common law rules regarding tender-back applicable to
general release but inapplicable to age discrimination claim); Clark v. Buffalo Wire Works Co., 3 F.
Supp. 2d 366, 372 (W.D.N.Y. 1998) (holding a waiver valid under state law, not valid under
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Although she might have heard about multi-million dollar awards in sex
discrimination lawsuits, a single visit to a competent lawyer educates her
about the hazards and costs of litigation, as well as the difference
between believing in and being able to prove discriminatory
employment practices.6 Her real choice is between guaranteed
compensation and a contingent right to additional payment if she is able
to prove the termination unlawful. 6 Further, even if she's quite angry
and "knows in her bones" that her employer acted illegally, she is also
practical: she recognizes the need to secure another job and the

unattractiveness of an applicant who is suing a former employer.
Indeed, given the barriers to a successful lawsuit, why would the
employer offer a hefty sum to keep our soon-to-be-terminated employee
from considering future litigation? Employers, unlike employees, are
repeat players in these situations. Through experience or counseling they
have learned that lawsuits are expensive, emotionally draining, and timeconsuming-whether or not the underlying complaint has merit."

Employers may know, or fear, that inculpatory information lurks in the
personnel files of other employees, departed or not. Any terminated
employee is a potential plaintiff, and all current and former employees
are potential witnesses for the plaintiff. To avoid the costs and surprises
of litigation, employers routinely buy out the statutory rights of
departing employees. 7' The future savings on the employee's salary and
ADEA).
68. See Galanter & Cahill, supra note 40, at 1352. They state that:
[tihe existence of a general preference for settlement does not mean that the pursuit of
settlement in any particular instance is an informed and uncoerced expression of such a
preference.... In some settings, lawyers spend a great deal of effort "educating" their
clients about the virtues of settlement compared to the cost, uncertainty, and arbitrariness
of adjudication.
Id.
69. See Hebert v. Mohawk Rubber Co., 872 F.2d 1104, 1112 (1st Cir. 1989) ("[T]o accept the
reasoning ... that a person's acceptance of an early retirement package is voluntary when faced
with a 'choice' between the Scylla of forced retirement or the Charybdis of discharge ... is to turn a
blind eye on the 'take-it-or-leave-it' nature of such an 'offer."').
70. In situations involving mass lay-offs, severance benefits and releases function as
liquidated damages that permit the employer to fix its costs and relieve itself of legal liability. See
Ralph Weber, Note, Severance Pay, Sales of Assets, and the Revolution of the Omitted Cases, 82
COLUM. L. REv. 593,597 (1982).
71. See Simon J. Nadel, Analysis & Perspective:EtrchangingEnhancedSeverance Packages
For Waiver of Legal Rights Raises Questions, 68 U.S.L.W. 2243 (Nov. 2, 1999); see also Abdallah
v. Coca-Cola Co., 1999 WL 527835, at *2, 79 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1409 (D.N.Ga. July 16,
1999) (where a judge ordered the employer to clarify the terms of a buy-out so that accepting
employees understood they waived their right to join an ongoing race discrimination lawsuit
challenging pay, performance and evaluations, but that the waiver did not bar them from testifying
in the case). Subsequently Coca-Cola permitted departing African-American employees to receive

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlelj/vol18/iss2/7

14

Silverstein: From Statute to Contract: The Law of the Employment Relationship

20011

Employment Relationship Reconsidered

benefits, along with the morale-enhancing effect on the remaining
employees, justify the cost, even when a particular employee is an
unlikely plaintiff."
Thus, it could be argued that both parties come out ahead; and the
question legitimately asked, why is this a problem? To answer this

inquiry, it is necessary to recall the dual nature of statutory rights at the
workplace. The legislature's goal was not to enable some employees to
benefit while employers engaged in business as usual. The legislative
purpose was instead to change the way in which business was being
done. Permitting employers to systematically purchase the right to
discriminate-or to be free of the fear of being accused of discriminatory
practices-wasn't part of the plan. All of the parties don't come out ahead
when employer and employee deregulate by contract. Legislative will is
thwarted; the "primary purpose" of preventing harm suffers.73
Equally pernicious, the security of believing that legal action will
not follow allows decision-makers, if they wish, to engage in the very
conduct prohibited by the laws. With the threat of litigation removed,
fair-minded managers do not have the incentive to make sure that subtle
prejudices have not affected decision-making; and bigoted managers
may indulge every preference, including ageism and sexism, in deciding
which employees should be bought-out and which should be retained.74

the enhanced benefits without agreeing not to join the pending lawsuit. See 45 Daily Lab. Rep.
(BNA) A-i (Mar. 7, 2000). The case was settled Nov. 16, 2000. See 223 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA)
AA-1 (Nov. 17,2000).
72. See Weber, supra note 70, at 597. Of course, employers are not alone in engaging in
opportunistic behavior. If only some firms offer contractual waivers, their reputation in the
community might cause workers who wish to be bought out of employment rights to seek
employment at those firms in order to perform poorly and be offered the buy-ouL Further, if all
firms offer contractual waivers, the statutes operate to transfer (some) wealth from (some)
employers to (some) employees, but that wasn't the reason for legislative recognition of employee
rights.
73. There is no reason to assume that these contractual waivers of statutory rights in exchange
for enhanced benefits is limited to situations involving termination. For example, a yearly bonus or
promotion or increase in compensation could be conditioned on a waiver of any legal claims arising
from the employment relationship up until the time of the signing of the waiver. In this way the
waiver looks similar to the no strike clause in a collective bargaining agreement, where economic
benefits are traded for the right to strike during the term of the agreement. Alternatively,
conditioning a job or promotion on an agreement not to compete, including an agreement that
breach establishes irreparable injury, substitutes a private for the traditionally judicial determination
on the propriety of injunctive relief. I am indebted to Judith Ravel for bringing this aspect of
privatization to my attention. Interview with Judith Ravel, Attorney, Law Offices of Judith Ravel
(Feb. 2001).
74. See Voilas v. Gen. Motors Corp., 170 F.3d 367, 370-72, 376 (3d Cir. 1999) (employer
challenged, as preempted by section 301 of the NLRA, allegations of common law fraud based upon
the employer's intentionally lying about an alleged plan to close a plant in order to induce older
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The twin goals of deterrence and compensation are simply not served by
allowing employers to contract out of the non-discrimination mandate by
drafting sophisticated waiver clauses. 7 5
B. Waivers-for-Private-GainI. Agreeing to Take Future Disputes Over
Statutory Rights to Arbitration
In addition to the exchange of money for the agreement not to
pursue possible legal claims, waivers-for-private-gain occur when
employers require employees, at the start of the employment relationship
or as a condition for continuing it, to agree to arbitrate, rather than
litigate, any disputes that arise in the future. Misleadingly termed
waivers of fora, rather than waivers of rights,7 6 courts that enforce these
agreements ignore the qualitative differences between arbitration and
litigation, including the relaxation or absence of evidentiary and
procedural rules in arbitration,n the limitation on pre-hearing discovery
in arbitration, 78 the circumscribed opportunity for judicial review of
arbitration decisions, 79 and the bias against awarding significant back and
employees to voluntarily accept early retirement); Bunnion v. Consol. Rail Corp., 108 F. Supp. 2d
403, 430-32 (E.D. Pa. 1999) (holding an agreement to participate in voluntary separation program,
not age, barred the rehired workers from employee status; and holding an employer did not violate
ADEA in rehiring workers as independent contractors or leased employees to do the same work
they had formerly done for less pay, without benefits while hiring younger employees into regular
full-time positions with full fringe benefits).
75. See Oubre v. Entergy Operations, Inc., 522 U.S. 422, 427 (1998) (stating that one reason
for not applying the common law tender back doctrine to ADEA waivers is the possibility that
contract doctrine would create a perverse incentive for employers to offer noncomplying waivers,
gambling on employees' inability to tender back benefits that induced acceptance of the offer);
Thorn v. Sundstrand Aerospace Corp., 207 F.3d 383, 387 (7th Cir. 2000) (demonstrating that a
committee review of a decision-maker's choices for termination in reduction-in-force "appears to
have been 'a liability shield invented by lawyers"'(citation omitted)).
76. See Schwartz, supra note 33, at 40-53 & nn.18-56 (describing a case study illustrating and
identifying the rights sacrificed when a dispute is resolved through arbitration rather than litigation);
see also id. at 95-98 & nn.242-265 (for further discussion).
77. See id. at41 n.18, 45 n.33, 46 n.34, 48 n.42 and 50 n.45 (reviewing the standards used by
various private entities that offer dispute resolution services to the public).
78, See id. at 47 n.35; see also COMSAT Corp. v. Nat. Sci. Found., 190 F.3d 269, 275-76
(4th Cir. 1999) (stating that the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 7, does not authorize arbitrators
to subpoena non-parties to appear at pre-hearing depositions or to present documents during prehearing discovery; section 7 only authorizes arbitrators to subpoena non-parties to appear at
hearings which is consistent with the "limited discovery process" and "efficiency that mark
arbitration proceedings.").
79. See Schwartz, supra note 33, at 52 n.50; see also Stephen J. Ware, Default Rules froin
Mandatory Rules: PrivatizingLaw Through Arbitration, 83 MINN. L. REV. 703 (1999) (discussing
cases and studies). Compare Green v. Ameritech Corp., 200 F.3d 967, 969-70 (6th Cir. 2000)
(stating that the arbitrator did not exceed his authority under arbitration agreement that required him
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front pay or punitive and compensatory damages in arbitration.5 0 And
once again, the loser is the legislative decision to correct market failures
through statutory regulation. Instead of contributing to a body of public
law that reinforces legislative recognition of systemic and corrosive
wrongs at the workplace and that establishes new rules of the game
consistent with the statutory goals, complainants must seek

compensation or promotion or freedom from harassment in a context
that suggests the problem-be it racism or favoritism-is trivial because it
occurs in isolated and individualized, perhaps even atypical, situations."
The analytic device facilitating the privatization of dispute
resolution in the workplace is the judicial discovery in 1991 of a

Congressional presumption in favor of enforcement of arbitration
agreements entered into as a condition of new or continued employment.

Initially, the Supreme Court declared contractual waivers of the judicial
forum for resolving alleged violations of statutory employment rights
unenforceable, 2 even while upholding similar prospective waivers of

to submit opinion when he issued brief and conclusory opinion rejecting former employee's age and
race claims) with Halligan v. Piper Jaffray, Inc., 148 F.3d 197, 204 (2d Cir. 1998) (reversing the
district court's finding of factual and legal support for arbitrators' brief and conclusory opinion
denying relief in age discrimination case, on the ground that the arbitrators manifestly disregarded
the law, the evidence or both). Of forty-four arbitration awards in the securities industry from June
1991 to March 1997, only four included legal reasoning in support of the arbitrators' decisions; in
the remaining 40 awards the written result stated in effect "claim upheld" or "claim denied." See
John D. Shea, Convocation, An EmpiricalStudy of Sexual Harassment/DiscriminationClaims in the
Post-GilmerSecurities Industry: Do Arbitrators'Written Awards Permit Sufficient JudicialReview
to Ensure Compliance with Statutory Standards?,32 SuFFoLK U. L. REv. 369, 411 (1998). It is, of
course, possible that the courts will establish a more searching standard of review for arbitration
awards mandated by pre-dispute waivers and involving statutory employment claims. See Julian J.
Moore, Note, ArbitralReview (or Lack Thereofl: Examining the ProceduralFairnessof Arbitrating
Statutory Claims, 100 COLSJM. L. REV. 1572, 1583 (2000) (commenting that the arbitrator expertise
justification no longer applies when individual statutory claims are being arbitrated because
arbitrators' interpretations of the proper application of statutes should not be given greater weight
than that of district courts, whose interpretations are subject to review by appellate courts).
However, the current defense of arbitration as adequate to the task of enforcing public policy rests
on the existing, circumscribed judicial review developed over the last 50 years. For xeform
proposals that focus on more active judicial review, see Murray S. Levin, The Role of Substantive
Law in Business Arbitration and the Importance of Volition, 35 AM. Bus. L.J. 105, 174-78 (1997),
and Geraldine Szott Moohr, Arbitration and the Goals of Employment Discrimination Law, 56
WASH. & LEE L. REv. 395, 447-59 (1999). But c Williams v. Cigna Fin. Advisors, 197 F.3d 752
(5th Cir. 1999) (applying weak standard in reviewing arbitration award).
80. See Schwartz, supra note 33, at 64-66; see also infra notes 105-07 and accompanying
text.
81. The shielding from public view of systemic violations of employment laws is particularly
pernicious in light of workers' misperceptions about their legal rights. See generally Kim, supra
note 56.
82. See Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36 (1974).
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statutory rights in antitrust and securities cases.83 Alexander v. GardnerDenver Co., 4 a 1974 decision, set the tone. The Court forcefully
instructed that "there can be no prospective waiver of an employee's
rights under Title VII '"5 and refused to foreclose a claimant's right to a
trial de novo under Title VII because of prior submission of his claim to
final arbitration pursuant to a collective bargaining agreement, since
"federal courts have been assigned plenary powers to secure compliance
with Title VII." 6 As the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit later
noted, the presumption in favor of the arbitral forum could attach in
antitrust and securities cases because the claims involved commercial
relations; but "in the passage of Title VII it was the congressional intent
that arbitration is unable to pay sufficient attention to the transcendent
public interest in the enforcement of Title VII." Similar considerations
barred collectively-negotiated, prospective waivers of the right to a
judicial forum under 42 U.S.C. § 198388 and the Fair Labor Standards
Act.89

But in 1991, the Supreme Court reconsidered whether certain pre-

dispute waivers of the judicial forum for resolving statutory claims could
be binding on employees, and extended the presumption in favor of an

arbitral forum from commercial to employment cases. In Gilmer v.
Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp.,3 a manager signed the standard,
mandatory securities industry registration form requiring arbitration of
"any" disputes as a condition of employment." When the manager
subsequently claimed violations of the ADEA, the employer

83. See Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 481 (1989);
Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 238 (1987); Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v.
Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 638-40 (1985). For a critical assessment of these
decisions and of arbitration in the securities industry, see Symposium, Contract Theory and
Securities Arbitration: Whither Consent?, 62 BROOKLYNL. REv. 1335, 1339-45 (1996).
84. 415 U.S. 36 (1974).
85. Id. at 51.
86. Id. at 45.
87. Swenson v. Mgmt. Recruiters Int'l, Inc., 858 F.2d 1304, 1307 (8th Cir. 1988).
88. See McDonald v. City of West Branch, 466 U.S. 284, 292 (1984) (refusing to enforce a
prospective waiver of rights under 42 U.S.C. §1983 pursuant to a collective bargaining agreement).
89. See Barrentine v. Ark.-Best Freight Sys., Inc., 450 U.S. 728, 740 (1981) (refusing to
enforce a prospective waiver of rights under the FLSA pursuant to a collective bargaining
agreement).
90. 500 U.S. 20 (1991).
91. Id. at 23. Richard Seymour refers to such a provision as a "cram down" arbitration. See
Richard T. Seymour, Proceedings of the 1999 Annual Meeting, Association of American Law
Schools Section on Employment DiscriminationLaw: Is There a DisconnectBetveen EEO Law and
the Workplace?, 3 EMPLoYEE RTs. & EMP. POL'Y J. 131, 150 (1999). Schwartz prefers the
adjective "compelled." See Schwartz, supranote 33, at 37.
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successfully argued that the appropriate forum for resolving the ADEA
claim was arbitration; that is, that the manager's waiver of the judicial

forum in the registration form, required of everyone in order to work in

the securities industry, was enforceable by the non-signatory employer.92
Adopting the analysis used in the antitrust and securities cases, the Court
found a presumption in favor of enforcement of contractually-based
arbitration clauses unless the plaintiff could point to evidence of
Congressional intent to preclude a waiver of judicial remedies for the
statutory rights at issue.93 Evidence of Congress' intent to defeat the

presumption in favor of arbitration may be found "in the text [of a law],
its legislative history, or an 'inherent
conflict' between arbitration and
94
purposes.
underlying
the [law's]
In Gilmer, the plaintiff argued only the inherent conflict prong of
this test, 9 having conceded that nothing in the ADEA as then enacted or
in its legislative history demonstrated a Congressional intention to
preclude prospective waivers of a judicial forum for ADEA claims. 96
And the Court, wrongly or not, found the arbitral forum not to
compromise substantive rights under the ADEA.97 Currently, lower
92. See Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 23-24.
93. See id. at 26.
94. Id. at 26.
95. See id. But see Schwartz, supra note 33, at 106-07 (criticizing the inherent conflict test).
96. See Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 26-27.
97. See id. at 28 ("'[S]o long as the prospective litigant effectively may vindicate [his or her]
statutory cause of action in the arbitral forum, the statute will continue to serve both its remedial and
deterrent function."' [quoting Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S.
614, 637 (1985)]). Commentators have stated that the Supreme Court's insistence that the waiver of
a judicial forum is not a waiver of substantive rights "is simply wrong," and others have ably
established this in discussing the myriad ways that arbitration annuls statutory rights. See Ware,
supra note 79, at 725 nn.101 & 103 (citing treatises and casebooks); see also Schwartz, supra note
33; supra notes 76-80 and accompanying text. But even if the waiver of the judicial forum is not a
"substantive" right, it is a statutory one, as the Court recognized in 1974 in Alexander v. GardnerDenver Co. See supra and notes 84-86 and accompanying text. The Court reaffirmed its holding in
Wright v. Universal Maritime Serv. Corp., 525 U.S. 70 (1998), discussed infra notes 131-35 and
accompanying text. But see Lorene D. Park, Jumping to Preclusions:Is Continuing Employment an
Implicit Acceptance of a Mandatory Pre-dispute Agreement to Arbitrate Statutory Employment
DiscriminationClaims? (2001) (unpublished manuscript on file with author) (citations omitted):
The Gilmer Court noted that "[a]lthough those procedures might not be as extensive as
in the federal courts, by agreeing to arbitrate, a party 'trades the procedures and
opportunity for review of the courtroom for the simplicity, informality, and expedition of
arbitration."' The disturbing thing about this statement is that it is not always clear that
the employee actually takes part in the trading when mandatory pre-dispute arbitration is
imposed unilaterally as a condition of continuing employment. Furthermore, the
Supreme Court ruled in the Erie line of cases that a change in procedural rules can have
substantive effects.*
*Gasperini v. Center for Humanities, Inc. ("Under the Erie doctrine, federal courts
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federal courts use Gilmer as authority to enforce pre-dispute agreements
to arbitrate claims under all employment laws.98
The analysis in Gilmer should not end the inquiry, however,
because contemporaneous with the Court's consideration of Gilmer,
Congress was amending employment discrimination laws in ways that
speak directly to Congressional intent to limit the use of pre-dispute
waivers of the judicial forum. First, as we have seen, Congress in 1990,
in the OWBPA amendments to the ADEA, 9 addressed the extent to
which contractual agreements could override statutory rights and singled
out as enforceable only those agreements which, at a minimum, met the
Congressional standards for a "voluntary and knowing" waiver of
statutory rights. Central to these standards are the right to sufficient
sitting in diversity apply state substantive law and federal procedural law...
[c]lassification of a law as 'substantive' or 'procedural' for Erie purposes is
sometimes a challenging endeavor."); Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins. In the Erie line
of cases, the question was whether state or federal law applied in a particular case
where jurisdiction was based on diversity of citizenship. The answer to this
question, turning upon whether the particular rule or law was procedural or
substantive, resulted from an in-depth analysis of whether the outcome would
change depending on which rule applied as well as whether or not the particular
case implicated the twin aims of the Erie rule: discouragement of forum-shopping
and avoidance of inequitable administration of the laws.... Presumably, if a given
rule or law would change the outcome depending on whether or not it was applied,
would provide a reason why a party would shop around for a particular forum, and
would administer laws inequitably among the various fora, then it was defined as
substantive. It would be interesting to see how the Supreme Court would apply a
similar analysis to the issue of whether or not statutory based discrimination claims
are appropriately resolved in an arbitral forum. As discussed with reference to the
criticisms of arbitration, the procedures vary greatly between the judicial and
arbitral fora. Further, the fact that employers prefer the arbitral forum and
increasingly require it as a condition of employment is analogous to forum
shopping. Finally, one could make the case that, given the differences in the
outcomes between the two fora, there is an inequitable administration of the laws
regarding employment discrimination.
Id. (citations omitted). Rather than simply applying a presumption of arbitrability, perhaps the
Courts should look more closely at the actual intent of the parties to a particular contract where
procedural rights with substantive implications are potentially being traded away, especially when
the employer is using standardized terms for all employees rather than dealing with employees
individually.
98. See, e.g., Williams v. Inhoff, 203 F.3d 758, 767 (10th Cir. 2000) (agreeing with second,
third, fourth and eighth circuits that a pre-dispute agreement requiring compelled arbitration is
enforceable as to ERISA claims); Desiderio v. Nat'l Ass'n of Sec. Dealers, Inc.,191 F.3d 198, 20306 (2d Cir. 1999) (same holding with regard to Title VII, citing cases from other circuits), cert.
denied, 121 S.Ct. 756 (2001); EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc., 193 F.3d 805, 808-09 (4th Cir. 1999)
(same holding as to the ADA), cert. granted, 121 S.Ct. 1401 (2001). The Supreme Court decided
Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 121 S.Ct. 1302, 1306 (2001), while this article was in press; the
Court held that the Federal Arbitration Act applies to contracts of employment.
99. See supranotes 59-65 and accompanying text.
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information and the opportunity to consult with an attorney before
signing the waiver.' °° No other waivers or releases of statutorilyguaranteed employment rights have been expressly approved by
Congress, thus evidencing Congressional intent that other statutory
rights are not to be compromised through pre-dispute contractual
provisions.' 1
Second, in its 1991 amendments to Title VII and the ADA'O,
Congress codified certain rights of employees and expanded the
remedies available under various statutes, most importantly for this
discussion, by providing for compensatory and punitive damages and for
the right to ajury trial in Title VII and ADA actions."3 Expressly adding
to plaintiffs' rights and remedies is surely evidence of a Congressional
intent to allow plaintiffs to choose, at the time of claiming an alleged
injury, the forum for dispute resolution. It is for the plaintiff
contemplating litigation to weigh the benefits and disadvantages of
asking the community or a privately-chosen arbitrator to assess the
defendant's conduct; it is for the plaintiff contemplating litigation to
choose whether to open up the discussion about discriminatory
employment practices and their consequences by electing a civil trial or
not. Additionally, compensatory and punitive damages are tort remedies,
rooted in law not contract, and are not waivable by agreement in
advance of a dispute.'0"
The statutory right to punitive damages in particular speaks to the
powerful public purpose of general deterrence. As the Supreme Court
understood in 1975, monetary awards, at that time back pay, could be
denied only if doing so "would not frustrate the central statutory
100. See 29 U.S.C. § 629(f) (1) (E).
101. The Gilmer court did refer to the OWBPA, stating "Congress, however, did not explicitly
preclude arbitration or other nonjudicial resolution of claims, even in its recent amendments to the
ADEA." Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 29 (1991). This statement while
accurate is misleading. See supra notes 82-86 and accompanying text. When Congress considered
the issue of waivers of statutory employment rights, Supreme Court precedent and all appellate
decisions held pre-dispute waivers unenforceable, making unnecessary an explicit Congressional
intent to preclude use of the arbitral forum. See id.
102. A series of Supreme Court decisions during the 1989-90 term had misinterpreted earlier
and important judicial glosses on the employment laws, and the 1991 Civil Rights Act pointedly
corrected the Court. See Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 3(4), 105 Stat. 1071
(1991) (codified at42 U.S.C. § 1981A).
103. See supranote 65 (explaining why the OWBPA was not included in the 1991 Civil Rights
Act).
104. See generally Schwartz, supra note 33, at 112 (stating that "[c]ourts generally hold
contract clauses to be void as against public policy if their effect is to exempt a party from liability
for its own future fraud or intentional torts, violations of statute[s] and injuries caused by gross
negligence or recklessness").
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purposes of [civil rights laws]"' ' because employers subject only to
injunctive relief would have "little incentive to shun practices of dubious
legality.""' Twenty years later, commenting on the damages provision of
the 1991 Civil Rights Act, the Court reiterated these observations,
adding that compensatory and punitive damages "can be expected to
give managers an added incentive to take preventative measures to ward
off discriminatory conduct by subordinates before it occurs."'
Rightly characterized as "strengthening" and enlarging plaintiffs
rights and remedies,"° the 1991 Act also included a seemingly innocuous
statutory and historical note, section 118:
Where appropriate and to the extent authorized by law, the use of
alternative means of dispute resolution, including settlement
negotiations, conciliation, facilitation, mediation, factfinding,
minitrials, and arbitration, is encouraged to resolve disputes arising
under the Acts or provisions of Federal law as amended by this title.'
This "polite bow to the popularity of 'alternative dispute resolution""'
has been cited, by lower federal courts, as all but incontrovertible
evidence of Congressional intent that prospective waivers of the judicial
forum be enforced against individuals who subsequently find themselves
in employment disputes."'
While it could plausibly be argued that section 118 supports the
substitution of an arbitral forum for a judicial one if the provision stood
alone, section 118 is not free-standing; it is a minor part of remedial
legislation that proclaims its intention to strengthen employee rights and
specifies, for the first time, the right to compensatory and punitive
damages as well as the right to a jury trial in Title VII and ADA cases."'
105. Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405,421 (1975).
106. Id. at 417.
107. Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 282 n.35 (1994) (emphasis omitted). See also
Gannon v. Circuit City Stores, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12125, at *10-*11, 83 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas.
(BNA)641, 643 (E.D. Mo. 2000) (refusing to enforce arbitration agreement that capped punitive
damages at $5,000).
108. Duffield v. Robertson Stephens & Co., 144 F.3d 1182, 1191 (9th Cir. 1998). See H.R.
REP. No 102-40(1), at 1 (1991), reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 694, 694 (stating a primary
purpose of the 1991 Act was "to strengthen existing protections and remedies available... [in
order] to provide more effective deterrence and adequate compensation").
109. Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 118, 105 Stat. 1071, 1081 (1991)
(codified as a historical and statutory note to 42 U.S.C. § 1981).
110. Pryner v. Tractor Supply Co., 109 F.3d 354, 363 (7th Cir. 1997) (Posner, C.J.).
111. See, e.g., Seus v. John Nuveen & Co., 146 F.3d 175, 182-83 (3d Cir. 1998).
112. In Seas v. John Nuveen & Co., 146 F.3d at 182-83, the Third Circuit takes the position
that section 118 refers to case law under the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), not case law under title
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As already pointed out, granting courts the authority to award previously
unavailable remedies is inconsistent with an intent to cut back on the use
of the judicial forum. And grouping arbitration with other means of
resolving disputes once they have arisen does not indicate a preference
for enforcement of pre-dispute waivers of statutory rights.13
Moreover, this is one of those instances in which ambiguity, if there
is any, can be resolved by resort to the legislative history. The House
Committee Report accompanying the 1991 Civil Rights Act stated:
The Committee emphasizes, however, that the use of alternative
dispute resolution mechanisms is intended to supplement, not supplant,
the remedies provided by Title VII. Thus, for example, the Committee
believes that any agreement to submit disputed issues to arbitration,
whether in the context of a collective bargaining agreement or in an
employment contract, does not preclude the affected person
from
4
seeking relief underthe enforcement provisions of Title VI.'

Further, the Committee Report evidenced its understanding of the
law, and the extent to which the Supreme Court had spoken on the
enforceability of pre-dispute arbitration agreements: "This view is
consistent with the Supreme Court's interpretation of Title VII in
Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co. The Committee does not intend for
the inclusion of this section be used to [sic] preclude rights and remedies
that would otherwise be available." "' The reference to Gardner-Denver,
VII, the ADA and the ADEA. Section 118's endorsement of arbitration "simply cannot be
'interpreted' to mean that the FAA is impliedly repealed with respect to agreements to arbitrate Title
VII and ADEA claims that will arise in the future." Id. at 182. One of the many problems with this
assertion is that nothing in the legislative history refers to the FAA; and Congress explicitly refused
to adopt a provision that would have allowed enforcement of binding arbitration agreements, unless
made when "knowing and voluntary." See infra note 116. Compare Thompson v. Thompson, 484
U.S. 174, 185 (1987) (Congress' choice of one of several conflicting proposals provides strong
evidence of intent) with Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 263 (1994) (stating that
rejection of proposed language concerning retroactivity of 1991 Act not determinative since "the
history of the 1991 Act conveys the impression that legislators agreed to disagree about whether and
to what extent the Act would apply to preenactmentconduct") (emphasis supplied).
113. In this regard the practice of appellate courts, in providing edited versions of the text of
section 118, is particularly unfortunate. See, e.g., Rosenberg v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner &
Smith, Inc., 170 F.3d 1, 9 (1st Cir. 1999) ("This section encourages the use of alternative means of
dispute resolution, where appropriate and to the extent authorized by law. These methods
include... arbitration."); Seus v. John Nuveen & Co., 146 F.3d 175, 182 (3d Cir. 1998) ("Where
appropriate and to the extent authorized by law, the use of alternative dispute resolution,
including.., arbitration, is encouraged to resolve disputes arrising under [Title VII and the
ADEA].") (citation omitted).
114. H.R. REP. No. 102-40(1]), at 41 (1991), reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 694, 735
(emphasis added).
115. Id. (citation omitted). Similar language appears in the Committee Report accompanying
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which emphasizes Congress' intent to create multiple remedies through
which to eliminate employment discrimination, and the wording of

section 118, encouraging many forms of alternative dispute resolution
that are used only after a claim arises, strongly reinforce the view that

the text of the 1991 Civil Rights Act is not evidence of a Congressional
intent to permit prospective waivers of the judicial forum.
The attentive reader may wonder why Congress, in the report
accompanying the 1991 Civil Rights Act, did not address Gilmer and the
purported preference for arbitration in resolving employment disputes
expressed by the Gilmer court. The simple answer is that, at the time the
Committee Report was drafted, the decision in Gilmer had not been
issued"' and the only Supreme Court and appellate court
the ADA. See H.R. REP. No. 101-485 (I), at 76-77 (1990), reprintedin 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 445,
499-500. The Committee also noted that Congress rejected a proposal that would have explicitly
permitted prospective agreements to arbitrate because "employers could refuse to hire workers
unless they signed a binding statement waiving all rights to file Title VII complaints" in court and
"American workers should not be forced to choose between their jobs and their civil rights." H.R.
REP. No. 102-40 (1) at 104, reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 549, 642. Individual statements of
members of Congress both support and are at odds with this reading of the Committee Reports, as is
true with most federal legislation; the Committee Reports are the "authoritative source for finding
the Legislature's intent" because they "represen[t] the considered and collective understanding of
those Congressmen involved in drafting and studying proposed legislation." Garcia v. United States,
469 U.S. 70,76 (1984) (then-Justice Rehnquist) (internal citations and quotations omitted).
116. Concededly, when the 1991 Civil Rights Act was passed, Gilmer had been decided. The
only mention of Gilmer in the legislative history occurs in identical interpretive memos, submitted
during the floor debate by then-Senator Robert Dole (R) and Representative Henry Hyde (R), which
are at odds with the Committee Report. See 137 CoNG. REC. S15478 (daily ed. Oct. 30, 1991)
(statement of Sen Dole); 137 CONG. REc. H9548 (daily ed. Nov. 7, 1991) (statement of Rep. Hyde).
There is no evidence that Gilmer and its implications were discussed then or at any other time after
the Committee Report was drafted, and it seems a fair inference that the language in section 118, "to
the extent authorized by law" referred, as indicated in the legislative history, to Gardner-Denver's
admonition against prospective waivers of statutory rights. Indeed, section 118 and the other
provisions of the 1991 Act were originally adopted by Congress in 1990 but President Bush refused
to sign that bill. And in 1991 Congress rejected a Republican proposal, H.R. 1375, which would
have explicitly encouraged binding arbitration "in place of the judicial resolution of disputes arising
under this Act and the Acts amended by this Act" but only where "knowingly and voluntarily"
agreed to by the parties. H.R. 175, 102d Cong. 12, reprintedin 137 CONG. REC. H9505, H9548
(daily ed. Nov.7, 1991). Subsequent attempts to reinstate the Gardner-Denverprohibition on predispute waivers of the judicial forum have not succeeded. See Civil Rights Procedures Protection
Act of 1997, H.R. 983 & S.63, 105th Cong. (Ist Sess. 1997) (proposing to amend Title VII and the
ADEA to state "[n]otwithstanding any Federal statute of general applicability that would modify
any of the powers and procedures expressly applicable to a claim arising under this title, such
powers and procedures shall be the exclusive powers and procedures applicable to such claims
unless after such claim arises the claimant voluntarily enters into an agreement to resolve such
claim through arbitration or another procedure") (emphasis added). The statute of general
applicability that has been used to bolster the argument in favor of the presumption of arbitrability is
the Federal Arbitration Act, which the Supreme Court held applicable to most contracts of
employment in Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 121 S.Ct. 1302, 1307 (2001).
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pronouncements on prospective waivers of employment rights followed
Gardner-Denver'sunambiguous refusal to enforce them." 7 Decisions
establishing the preference for arbitration had appeared only in securities

and anti-trust cases involving prospective waivers of the judicial forum,
and those decisions did not hint at extending the presumption in favor of
arbitration to resolution of statutory claims in the employment context."8
The one Court of Appeals that has seriously examined the text and
legislative history of the relevant statutes, the Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit in Duffield v. Robertson Stephens & Co.," 9 found direct
evidence of Congressional intent not to permit pre-dispute waivers of the

judicial forum for resolving employment disputes based on statutory
rights.'20 However, the Ninth Circuit's learning is either dismissed or
denigrated by the other Courts of Appeal, which enforce prospective
waivers as long as the employee could have conceivably been aware of
the obligation to use arbitration to resolve future disputes involving
statutory rights.' Thus, some courts find a waiver if an employment
application includes language that "any" dispute goes to arbitration;'2

some courts test a waiver's "appropriateness" by insuring that the
employer provided the information it promised to the prospective
employee at the time of signing;' 3 and some courts find waivers
117. See McDonald v. City of W. Branch, 466 U.S. 284, 285 (1984) (refusing to enforce a
prospective waiver of rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 pursuant to a collective bargaining agreement);
Barrentine v. Ark.-Best Freight Sys., Inc., 450 U.S. 728, 745 (1981) (refusing to enforce a
prospective waiver of rights under the FLSA pursuant to a collective bargaining agreement). The
appellate court decisions are collected in Duffield v. RobertsonStephen & Co., 144 F.3d 1182, 1188
(9th Cir. 1998).
118. As Geraldine Szott Moohr neatly summarizes: "[t]he claims in the [commercial cases]
shared a common ground: all of the plaintiffs alleged injury to economic interests sustained by
violations of laws aimed at regulating business dealings .... [while civil rights injuries] are based
on rights to employment and personal dignity." Moohr, supra note 79, at 418-19 n.126 (citations
omitted).
119. 144F.3d 1182 (9th Cir. 1998).
120. See id. at 1185.
121. See Sens v. John Nuvegn & Co., 146 F.3d 175 (3d Cir. 1998).
122. Id. at 184.
123. See Rosenberg v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 170 F.3d 1, 17, 20, 21 (1st
Cir. 1999). The court refused to compel plaintiff to submit her Title VII claim to arbitration only
because the defendant, Merrill Lynch, used the standard Form U-4 but failed to take "the modest
effort required to make relevant information regarding the arbitrability of employment disputes
available to [the plaintiff] as it committed itself to do [in the Form U-4 waiver document]" thus
making non-enforcement of the waiver "appropriate and authorized by law" under section 118; "[i]f
Merrill Lynch had provided the rules [regarding arbitration] to Rosenberg but she did not read them,
that would not save her." I at 21 n.17 (citations omitted). Rosenberg is a particularly dispiriting
decision because the district court authored a thoughtful, scholarly opinion explaining why the 1991
amendments to Title VII preclude prospective waivers of judicial determination of employment
discrimination claims. See Rosenberg v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 995 F. Supp.
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"voluntary and knowing" because the 1 2employment
application or
4
personnel handbook referred to arbitration.

Because the issue has become whether the facts support a finding
that a particular individual had access to information and, sometimes,

whether a particular employer met its obligation to provide that
information, the decisions are thick with facts and thin on analysis. The

question is not why we would expect a job applicant to fly-speck an
employment manual to see how disputes would be resolved. The
question is whether she had constructive notice to do so, with her waiver
of the judicial forum upheld even though the manual talked about taking
disputes to arbitration, not about substituting private arbitration for
public judgment by jury and judge, and even though the manual referred
to employment disputes without referencing disputes arising from

alleged violations of statutes relating to employment. As one court
concluded after reviewing the cases: "[a]n agreement to arbitrate is to be
treated like any other contract, Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 24,. . . and a failure
to fully read and consider the contract cannot relieve [a claimant] of its

provisions."'

It is difficult to explain the insistence by the courts that section 118
is powerful evidence of Congressional intent to permit pre-dispute
190 (D. Mass. 1998). The district court also discussed the "structural bias" of the arbitral forum in
the securities industry. Id. at 207. Under facts virtually identical to those in Rosenberg, the Court of
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit enforced the agreement to arbitrate. See Haskins v. Prudential Ins. Co.
of Am., 230 F.3d 231, 241 (6th Cir. 2000).
124. See Patterson v. Tenet Healthcare, Inc., 113 F.3d 832, 835 (8th Cir. 1997); see also
Michalski v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 177 F.3d 634, 637 (7th Cir. 1999) (concluding that an
employer's promise to be bound by arbitration contained in handbook is adequate consideration for
employee's agreement to use arbitration contained in separate document).
125. Bryant v. Am. Express Fin. Advisors, Inc., 595 N.W.2d 482, 486 (Iowa 1999). See also
First Options of Chi., Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 944 (1995) (instructing courts to apply state law
principles that govem the formation of contracts in deciding whether parties agreed to arbitrate a
certain matter); Haskins, 230 F.3d at 239 (adopting contract law standards in applying agreements
to arbitrate); Michalski, 177 F.3d at 636 (same holding). One barrier to enforcement of an
individual's pre-dispute agreement to arbitrate occurs when the complainant might bear substantial
filing fees and/or the cost of the arbitration. See, e.g., Shankle v. B-G Maint. Mgmt. of Colo., Inc.,
163 F.3d 1230, 1235 (10th Cir. 1999) (holding that a fee-splitting provision renders arbitration
agreement unenforceable); Paladino v. Avnet Computer Tech., Inc., 134 F.3d 1054, 1062 (11th Cir.
1998) (same holding); Cole v. Bums Int'l Sec. Servs., Inc., 105 F.3d 1465, 1468 (D.C. Cir. 1997)
(requiring employer to bear the sole costs of an arbitrator's fee as a condition of enforcing the
agreement to arbitrate). But see Bradford v. Rockwell Semiconductor Sys., Inc., 238 F.3d 549, 556
(4th Cir. 2001) (rejecting per se rule against all fee-splitting agreements in favor of case-by-case
inquiry on individualized costs). Alternatively, some courts view the possibility that arbitral fees
will be imposed on the complainant as an insufficient reason for not enforcing the agreement to
arbitrate, but note that judicial review can ultimately protect a complainant subjected to excessive
fees. See Koveleskie v. SBC Capital Mkts, Inc., 167 F.3d 361, 366 (7th Cir. 1999); Rosenberg v.
Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 170 F.3d 1, 16 (1st Cir. 1999).
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contracting away of the right to a judicial forum to resolve statutory
claims, particularly in the face of the Duffield court's careful
examination of the text and legislative history of the relevant statutes.'2
Ideology may have something to do with what, to the educated observer,
appears to be an almost willful perversion of statutory language and
legislative history.' 2 Or perhaps, judges understand that the Supreme
Court's now-repeatedly expressed preference for arbitration is policybased, and they assume it is futile to engage in fresh analysis of evidence
in statutory language or legislative history of Congress' intent to
overcome that presumption. Like employment disputes committed to
arbitration even before they arise, statutory analysis does not benefit
from a fair hearing.
Insistence on a presumption in favor of the arbitral forum in
employment cases leads to a further anomaly. Unions routinely agree in
collective bargaining agreements that arbitration is the final and binding
means of dispute resolution.'2 Does this mean that waiver of the judicial
forum by a union is a bar to the judicial forum for employees working
under collective bargaining agreements? As Judge Posner wryly
observed:
It would be at least a mild paradox for Congress, having in another
amendment that it made to Title VII in 1991 conferred a right to trial
by jury for the first time .... to have empowered unions, in those same
amendments, to prevent workers from obtaining jury trials in these
126. See Duffield v. Robertson Stephens & Co., 144 F.3d 1182 (9th Cir. 1998).
127. See, e.g., David Sherwyn et al., In Defense of Mandatory Arbitration of Employment
Disputes: Saving the Baby, Tossing out the Bath Water, and Constructing A New Sink in the
Process,2 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 73, 103-04 (1999) (where the authors insist that commentary
about the deliberate ambiguity of some provisions in the 1991 Civil Rights Act means that section
118 was a product of political compromise). Unfortunately for the authors, the articles they cite
discussing the legislative history of the 1991 Civil Rights Act address ambiguity concerning some
sections of the law, but not section 118. See Robert Belton, The Unfinished Agenda of the Civil
Rights Act of 1991, 45 RUTGERS L. REv. 921, 924-25, 961 (1993) (the Sherwyn et al. article's
citation to Belton is to page 924, which refers to the debates on affirmative action, but at page 961
Belton observes that if ADR becomes a "take it or leave it" condition of employment, the
protections of the OWBPA will need to be applied in evaluating the voluntariness of the agreement
to arbitrate); Rebecca Hanner White, The EEOC, the Courts and Employment Discrimination
Policy: Recognizing the Agency's Leading Role in StatutoryInterpretation, 1995 UTAH L. REV. 51,
58 (arguing for judicial deference to EEOC determinations; the EEOC, of course, rejects mandatory
arbitration of employment disputes); Reginald C. Govan, Honorable Compromises and the Moral
High Ground: The Conflict Betveen the Rhetoric and the Content of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 46
RUTGERS L. REv. 1, 237-38 (1993) (the Sherwyn et al. article's citation is to page 238 which, like
Belton's article, refers to the debates on affirmative action; unlike Belton's article, I could not find a
reference to alternative dispute resolution or section 118 in Govan's article).
128. See Sherwyn, supranote 127, at 102.
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The Supreme Court recognizes, but has not resolved, the tension
between Gardner-Denver'sabsolute prohibition of prospective waivers

of statutory fights and Gilmer's presumption in favor of enforcing
prospective agreements to arbitrate employment disputes.'3 In Wright v.
UniversalMaritime Service Corp.,' the Court refused to force a unionrepresented individual with an ADA claim to substitute arbitration
pursuant to a collective bargaining agreement for the judicial forum."

Repeating that use of the judicial forum "is not a substantive right," the
Court nonetheless held that in the context of bargaining agreements the

presumption in favor of arbitration did not apply unless the waiver was

"clear and unmistakable" because "Gardner-Denver at least stands for

the proposition that the right to a federal judicial forum is of sufficient
importance to be protected against less-than-explicit union waiver in a
[collective bargaining agreement]."' 33 Because on the facts in Wright

there was no "clear and unmistakable" waiver, ' the Court did not
address, and noted that it did not address, whether it would enforce a

"clear and unmistakable" union waiver of statutory employment rights. 3 '

129. Pryner v. Tractor Supply Co., 109 F.3d 354,363 (7th Cir. 1997).
130. See id. at364.
131. 525 U.S. 70 (1998).
132. See id.
133. Id. at 80. See also Schumacher v. Souderton Sch. Dist., 163 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2461, 2466
(E.D. Pa. 2000) (applying the "clear and unmistakable" standard to claimed waiver by union of
constitutional rights).
134. Clause 17 of the collective bargaining agreement provided that "[iut is the intention and
purpose of all parties hereto that no provision or part of this Agreement shall be violative of any
Federal or State Law." Wright, 525 U.S. at 73. The Supreme Court correctly determined that this
language did not make compliance with the ADA a contractual commitment, and compared the
explicit commitment in the bargaining agreement that "[t]he requirements of the Occupations [sic]
Safety and Health Administration shall be binding on both Parties." Id.
135. But see Clarke v. UFI Inc., 98 F. Supp. 2d 320, 332 (E.D.N.Y. 2000) (union-negotiated
contract "clearly and unmistakably" provides for arbitration of harassment claims and thus plaintiffs
waived Title VII right to sue in federal court) (citing Gardner-Denver);Safrit v. Cone Mills, 1999
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18985, at *5, 162 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2974, 2976 (M.D.N.C. 1999) (unionnegotiated contract "clearly and unmistakably" provides for arbitration of gender discrimination
claims and thus female employee waived Title VII right to sue in federal court, citing Wright), Cf
Rogers v. N.Y. Univ., 220 F.3d 73, 75-77 (2d Cir. 2000) (refusing to stay an action alleging
violations of the FMLA, ADA, and state and local anti-discrimination laws pending a unionnegotiated arbitration on two independent grounds: (1) Alexander v. Gardner-Denveris still good
law; and (2) a waiver of statutorily conferred rights in a collective bargaining agreement is
sufficiently clear and unmistakable, per Wright, only if (i) the arbitration clause contains a provision
whereby employees specifically agree to submit all federal causes of action arising out of
employment to arbitration; or (ii) the collective bargaining agreement contains an explicit
incorporation of the statutory anti-discrimination requirements in addition to a broad and general
arbitration clause; specific incorporation requires identifying the anti-discrimination statutes by
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Of course, the "clear and unmistakable" standard does not apply in
the Gilmer context, because "Gilmer involved an individual's waiver of
his own rights."'36 Logically, the distinction drawn by the Court is
incoherent, since the terms of collective bargaining agreements are in
fact negotiated-which means discussed, bargained over, traded, knownwhile the terms of most individual employment contracts are imposed
unilaterally by employers in circumstances unlikely to put employees
and prospective employees on notice about collateral details concerning

the forum for resolving future, hypothetical disputes involving statutory
rights.'37
The legal standard for a knowing waiver of the judicial forum thus
appears to be whether there was some reference to arbitration or to
dispute resolution procedures in some document provided by the
employer to an applicant or employee at some time during the process of
hiring, retaining or promoting an employee that could conceivably have
put the worker on notice that a dispute would be heard in arbitration,
regardless of whether this notice also spelled out that use of arbitration
entails waiver of a judicial forum.
What of the concept of voluntariness as an independent prerequisite
for enforcement of waivers-for-private-gain? Most decisions do not
separately address the issue, discussing the phrase "knowing and
voluntary" as a single requirement and deploying the same evidence to
establish this now-unified element.' Judges must wrangle with the
meaning of voluntariness, however, in those instances where a worker
name or citation, and creating coextensive rights is not the same as making compliance with the
statutes a contractual commitment that would be subject to the arbitration clause). See also Kennedy
v. Superior Printing Co., 215 F.3d 650 (6th Cir. 2000); Brown v. ABF Freight Sys., Inc., 183 F.3d
319, 321-22 (4th Cir. 1999) (same). On the other hand, the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit has
held that unions are precluded, under Gardner-Denver,from prospectively agreeing to binding
arbitration of individual statutory claims and that employer-required arbitration agreements
covering statutory claims are not a mandatory subject of bargaining (under the RLA, but using cases
decided under the NLRA); but employers may require employees to sign pre-dispute agreements to
arbitrate statutory claims as condition of employment. See Air Line Pilots Ass'n v. Northwest
Airlines, Inc., 199 F.3d 477,480 (D.C. Cir. 1999), vacated, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 3756 (D.C. Cir.
Mar. 9, 2000) (en banc, without opinion), reinstated, 2011 F.3d 1312 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (en banc
without explanation).
136. Wright, 525 U.S. at 80.
137. However, if the employee is a very highly compensated individual he may be put on
notice about the collateral details. See Focus On... Employment Agreements, 18 IER 72 (Nov. 28,
2000) (discussing individual contracts in the "new-economy companies").
138. For an academic defense of this practice, see Samuel Estreicher, PredisputeAgreements
to Arbitrate Statutory Employment Claims, 72 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1344 (1997). Estreicher's elevation
of in-house dispute resolution programs to the status of a "public good" is effectively rejected in
Karen Halverson, Arbitration and the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 67 U. CIN. L. REv. 445, 483-85
(1999).
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challenges the enforceability of an obligation to arbitrate disputes where
worker knowledge is unquestioned: for example, where incumbent
employees are required to sign stand-alone agreements to arbitrate as a
condition of continued employment; 3. or where applicants expressly
refuse the arbitration clause and are explicitly told they are therefore
being denied a job; 40 or where applicants accept arbitration under protest
and subsequently seek release from4the promise to use arbitration at the
time an employment dispute arises. '
Courts utilize different approaches, none of which satisfactorily
clarifies the meaning of voluntariness in the context of waiving statutory
rights. Some state courts will examine a worker's agreement through the

lens of the common law, using traditional concepts of duress, fraud, and
unconscionability, usually concluding that the promise to arbitrate is
enforceable. 42 The leading authority on arbitration under the Federal

Arbitration Act states that it is highly unlikely that "unconscionability or
adhesion143doctrine [will] result in the unenforceability of an arbitration
clause."'
Other courts obviate the need to determine the voluntariness of the
worker's promise to arbitrate by finding the employer-mandated
arbitration procedure so one-sided as to constitute a sham. For example,
139. See Bailey v. Fed. Nat'l Mortgage Ass'n, 209 F.3d 740, 746-47 (D.C. Cir. 2000)
(continuing to work for employer that imposes arbitration as dispute resolution policy may not be
evidence of acceptance necessary to bind employee who protested the policy at the time it was
announced). State courts are divided on whether requiring employees to sign pre-dispute arbitration
agreements as a condition of employment violates public policy. Compare Lagatree v. Luce,
Forward, Hamilton & Scripps, 88 Cal. Rptr. 2d 664, 672 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999) (finding no violation)
with Phillips v. CIGNA Invs., 27 F. Supp. 2d 345 (D. Conn. 2000) (applying Connecticut law to
find no acceptance of agreement to arbitrate in employee's continuing to work for employer after
institution of new arbitration policy).
140. See Douglas v. Timex Corp., 78 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1700, 1702-03 (S.D. Tex.
1998).
141. See EEOC v. Frank's Nursery & Crafts, Inc., 966 F. Supp. 500, 502 (E.D. Mich. 1997),
rev'donother grounds, 177 F.3d 448 (6th Cir. 1999).
142. See, e.g., Pichly v. Nortech Waste, 86 Cal. Rptr. 2d 460 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999) (arriving at
the same result after reconsideration in light of Armendariz v. Found.Health PsychcareServs., Inc.,
6 P.3d 669 (Cal. 2000), which held an arbitration agreement unconscionable per California state law
because the employee had no reasonable choice but to sign and because agreement bound employee
but not employer); Strawn v. AFC Enter., Inc., 70 F. Supp. 2d 717,726 (S.D. Tex. 1999) (voiding as
against public policy an agreement to accept compensation for future job injuries, where
compensation was substantially less than that afforded in state scheme when combined with an
agreement to arbitrate future disputes). But see Adams, 121 S.Ct. at 1306 (reaffirming in dicta the
holding in Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984), which held that the Federal Arbitration
Act preempts state arbitration laws and applies in state as well as federal courts).
143. II IAN R. MACNEIL, RICHARD E. SPIEDEL & THOMAS J. STIPANOWICH, FEDERAL
ARBITRATION LAW: AGREEMENTS, AWARDS AND REMEDIES UNDER THE FEDERAL ARBITRATION

ACr§ 19.3.1, at 19:26 (Supp. 1999).
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in Hooters of America, Inc. v. Phillips,'" a six-year employee
complained after a Hooters official and brother of the principal owner
grabbed and slapped her buttocks. 4 1 When management told her to "let it
go," she quit her job.146 Her sexual harassment complaint was met with a
lawsuit to compel arbitration of the dispute, pursuant to an eight-yearold alternative dispute resolution program, implemented as a condition
for eligibility for raises, transfers and promotions.1 47 Phillips signed the
agreement to arbitrate twice, but in both instances Hooters failed to give
her the rules and regulations referred to in the document. 148 The Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, after reviewing Supreme Court authority
and affirming that in general pre-dispute agreements to arbitrate Title
VII claims are valid and enforceable, found that "Hooters materially
breached the arbitration agreement by promulgating rules so egregiously
unfair as to constitute a complete default of its contractual obligation to
draft arbitration rules and to do so in good faith.... [T]he result was
hardly recognizable as arbitration at all."' 49 At every point in the rules,
the employer had no obligation to disclose information and was given
flexibility as to the claims it could present while the employee was
bound by. specific time lines, early and detailed notice of claims,
identification of witnesses, etc. 5' In addition the Hooters system
provided for no compensatory damages and capped punitive damages at
one year's gross cash compensation, estimated at $13,000, since the
plaintiff derived most of her income from tips.' But the crowning insult
was Hooters' total control of the list of arbitrators from which the
employee had the "right" to choose one as her representative on the
three-person panel.' 2 In addition to unilaterally determining the list of
arbitrators, Hooters did not limit the selection criteria it employed to

144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.

173 F.3d 933 (4th Cir. 1999).
See id. at 935.
Id.
See id. at 935-36.
See id. at 936.
Hooters, 173 F.3d at 938, 940.

150. See id. at 938.
151. The estimate of the worth of the punitive damage claim is from Phillips' attorney. See
Seymour, supra note 91, at 150. For a detailed arbitration scheme that has met mixed judicial
responses, see Michalski v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 177 F.3d 634, 636 (7th Cir 1998); Morrison v.
Circuit City Stores, Inc., 70 F. Supp. 2d 815, 828 (S.D. Ohio 1999) (upholding arbitration
agreement, which sets a one-year limit on filing claims, restricts discovery, bars class claims, limits
back pay, does not allow front pay, and caps punitive damages at $5,000). But see Johnson v.
Circuit City Stores, 203 F.3d 821 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 530 U.S. 1276 (2000) (refusing to enforce
arbitration agreement because it did not provide for full remedies available under 42 U.S.C. § 1981).
152. See Hooters, 173 F.3d at938.
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insure neutrality and in no way agreed to keep on the list any arbitrators
who perchance upheld a plaintiff's claim. 3 The appellate court was
careful to note, however, that:
[tihis case. . . is the exception that proves the rule: fairness objections
should generally be made to the arbitrator, subject only to limited postarbitration judicial review as set forth in section 10 of the FAA ....To
uphold the promulgation of [Hooters'] aberrational scheme under the
heading of arbitration would undermine, not
14 advance, the federal
policy favoring alternative dispute resolution. '
In addition to preserving for the historical record the sad
development of the case law upholding prospective waivers of statutory
rights in cases involving employment claims, this part of the Article
offers further evidence that an agreement to waive statutory rights
requires little more than adherence to procedures which give
constructive notice to the employee or prospective employee that
securing a job or a benefit is conditioned on waiving statutory rights.
There is no legal requirement of being in a position to consent in an
environment conducive to an informed judgment.
So far I have questioned the enforceability of waivers-for-privategain, whether of present and past substantive claims or of future
opportunities to litigate statutory claims, as unauthorized by the statutory
regimes regulating the employment relationship and as undermining the
goal of deterring unlawful conduct. Further, I have claimed that the
courts and Congress in the OWBPA recognize the potential weakening
of statutory regulation of the employment relationship but find solace in
the fiction that these waivers are entered into "knowingly and
voluntarily." However, I have suggested that these waivers, even if
executed knowingly in the sense of having been disclosed by the
employer, cannot be described as agreed to by the employee voluntarily,
unless voluntary agreement means no more than acceptance following
disclosure without reference to the substance of the terms of the
agreement. Part IIof this Article now tests the law's standard for a
153. See id. at 939.
154. Id. at 941; see also Floss v. Ryan's Family Steak Houses, Inc., 211 F.3d 306, 315-16 (6th
Cir. 2000) (prehire arbitration agreement between employees and arbitration service unenforceable,
because service "reserved the right to alter the applicable rules and procedures without any
obligation to notify, much less receive consent from, [plaintiffs]. [Service's] right to choose the
nature of its performance renders its promise illusory."), cert. denied, 121 S. Ct. 763 (2001);
Armendariz v. Found. Health Psychcare Servs., Inc., 6 P.3d 669, 681, 692 (Cal. 2000) (holding an
agreement to arbitrate not enforceable because it does not meet minimal requirements to vindicate
statutory rights and is against public policy and unconscionably unilateral).
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voluntary waiver against recent philosophical literature that rigorously
analyzes the concept of voluntariness.
HI. NON-VOLUNTARINESS THAT VITIATES CONSENT
Standard contract analysis holds that consent is uncoerced as long
as it is not the product of duress, which normally means physical force
or fraud.'55 Congress and the courts are recognizing, however, that a
prospective waiver of statutory rights requires more than the mere
absence of force or fraud to be considered voluntary." 6 On the basis of
the OWBPA, Gilmer and appellate decisions, it appears that the law will
find a prospective waiver voluntary if individual employees or
applicants had constructive notice of the waiver. This applies even if
they did not have the incentive or background knowledge to understand
the real world consequences of the waiver and regardless of whether
they were unable to negotiate adjustments to employers' take-it-orleave-it offers.'57 In this section I argue that the over reliance on a due
process model to qualify offers as non-coercive stems from a
fundamental misunderstanding of the concept of voluntariness, and that
a nuanced analysis will produce a more satisfactory method for inquiring
into the enforceability of waivers-for-private-gain. I will proceed by
showing that force and fraud ought not be the only bases for vitiating
voluntary consent, relying primarily on the work of Joel Feinberg and G.
A. Cohen."' This philosophically-based understanding of voluntary
consent will in turn aid in demonstrating the inadequacy of a due process
model for assessing the enforceability of waivers-for-private-gain.

155. See generally ALAN WERTHEIMER, COERCION (1987).
156. See 29 U.S.C. § 626(f) (1); supra note 67.
157. Wright v. Universal Mar. Serv. Corp., 525 U.S. 70, 70 (1998), adds the wrinkle, in the
unionized workplace, that statutory rights may be waived prospectively only if the union, as
representative of the workers, signs off on a provision that clearly and unambiguously agrees to the
arbitral forum as the exclusive means for challenging alleged violations of enumerated statutory
rights during the term of the collective bargaining agreement. This formula fits within the due
process model referred to in the text.
158. See JOEL FEINBERG, HARM TO SELF: THE MORAL LIMrrS OF THE CRIMINAL LAW (1986);
G. A. Cohen, Capitalism,Freedom and the Proletariat,in LIBERTY 160 (David Miller ed., 1991). I
remind the reader that we are inquiring into the voluntariness of the employee's assent to waiversfor-private-gain; thus the perspective from which we judge the offer is the employee's. We have no
reason to inquire whether consent is vitiated for purposes of judging a defendant's reliance on the
victim's consent pursuant to the criminal law.
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A. Defining Voluntariness
In Henn v. National Geographic Society,'59 Judge Frank
Easterbrook discusses the legality of an early retirement program and the
voluntariness of the plaintiffs' agreements to participate. 60 Because the
approach is typical of legal analysis, superficially persuasive and often
repeated, 16' Henn is a good place to begin an inquiry on whether
agreements obtained short of physical force or fraud should vitiate
consent.
[W]e start by assuming that the employer is complying with the
ADEA.... Now the employer adds an offer of early retirement.
Provided the employee may decline the offer and keep working under
lawful conditions, the offer makes him better off. He has an additional
option, one that may be (as it was here) worth a good deal of money.
He may retire, receive the value of the package, and either take a new
job (increasing his income) or enjoy new leisure. He also may elect to
keep working and forfeit the package. This may put him to a hard
choice; he may think the offer too good to refuse; but it is not Don
Corleone's "Make him an offer he can't refuse." "Your money or your
life?" calls for a choice, but each option makes the recipient of the
offer worse off. When one option makes the recipient better off, and
the other is the status quo, then the offer is beneficial. That the benefits
may overwhelm the recipient and dictate the choice cannot be
dispositive. The question "Would you prefer $100,000 to $50,000?"
will elicit the same answer from everyone, but it does not on that
account produce an "involuntary" response.'62
159. 819 F.2d 824 (7th Cir. 1987).
160. See id.
161. See, e.g., Raskin v. Wyatt Co., 125 F.3d 55, 62 (2d Cir. 1997); Bilstein v. St. John's Coll.,
74 F.3d 1459, 1469 (4th Cir. 1996); Quinn v. Newspaper Ass'n, No. 95-1653, 1996 U.S. App.
LEXIS 25307 (6th Cir. 1996); Houghton v. SIPCO, Inc., 38 F.3d 953, 959 (8th Cir. 1994); Vega v.
Kodak Caribbean, Ltd., 3 F.3d 476, 480 (Ist Cir. 1993); Gray v. York Newspapers, Inc., 957 F.2d
1070, 1081 (3d Cir. 1992); Mitchell v. Mobil Oil Corp., 896 F.2d 463, 467 (10th Cir. 1990); Bodnar
v. Synpol, Inc., 843 F.2d 190, 192 (5th Cir. 1988). Of the 177 citing references reported by
Shepards on September 3, 2000, the few that distinguished Henn relied on factual records that
included evidence of explicit threats of dismissal or fraud. See, e.g., Cooper v. Neiman Marcus
Group, 125 F.3d 786, 791 (9th Cir. 1997) ("[Plaintiff] was not given the choice of continuing to
work indefinitely .... To the contrary... [she was] to be terminated at the end of 90 days at the
latest, whichever option she took."); Maez v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel., Inc., 54 F.3d 1488, 14985001 (10th Cir. 1995) (purposeful deceit to induce retirement).
162. Henn, 819 F.2d at 826. See also Lighton v. Univ. of Utah, 209 F.3d 1213, 1221 (10th Cir.
2000); Connors v. Chrysler Fin. Corp., 160 F.3d 971, 974 (3d Cir. 1998) (same holding as to claim
of constnictive discharge); Johnson v. Shulman & Hall, L.P.A., 15 I.E.R. Cas. (BNA) 1204 (Ohio
Ct. App. 1999) (holding no duress where contract employee assents to new status as employee-at-
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The structure of this argument is: (1) the choice for each salesman is an
individualized determination of whether he prefers continued
employment or "a great deal of money" with which to finance leisure or
a new job; and (2) beneficial offers are never coercive, even if consent is
tricked or forced, because, accepted or not, the recipient is not worse off.
There are two problems with this approach: it uses the wrong baseline
for testing whether an offer is coercive; and it uncritically denies the
possibility that offers which increase options can at the same time be
coercive.
1. The Baseline Problems
By describing a salesmen's choice as between remaining employed
and retiring with increased funds, Easterbrook takes the reality, and thus
the sting, out of the offer of early retirement.'9 In Henn," 4 the National
Geographic Society offered generous benefits to fifteen employees over
the age of fifty-five to induce them to retire early.' 6 Supervisors had
earlier informed each employee that his sales record was sluggish, 66 and
all fifteen had received a generally-distributed report recommending the
discharges of older salesmen because "[s]erious repercussions will result
if younger sales personnel are not available to cultivate clients in new
growth industries and insure future sales."' 67 The Society did not explain
what actions
it would take if the salesmen did not take early
6
retirement. 1
The effect of the offer, given the uncertainty about the opportunity
for continued employment, was, and could be foreseen to be, a choice
between no employment with benefits or no employment without
benefits. So the appropriate baseline was no employment. Continued
employment, a condition essential to Judge Easterbrook's description of
the employees' consent to the offer as voluntary, was simply not one of
the options they could choose, because none could safely assume that if
he refused the offer, he would be retained. 69 Viewed in the context of the
will, notwithstanding her claim that she assented only because of economic necessity).
163. See Henn, 819 F.2d at 826.
164. 819 F.2d at 824.
165. See id. at 826.
166. See id. at 829-30.
167. Id. at 830.
168. See Henn, 819 F.2d at 829.
169. While it is true that the law does not require an employer to guarantee job security, the
offer of early retirement suggests that an employer views one's services as less than necessary to the
enterprise. See McNab v. Gen. Motors Corp., 162 F.3d 959, 960 (7th Cir. 1998) (Easterbrook, J.).
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actual circumstances of the offer, the absence of unlawful deceit or
threats does not answer the question whether the Society so manipulated
the choices presented to its older salesmen as to force them to take early
retirement. And, I would argue, the proper baseline for considering the
coerciveness of offers in the employment context must recognize the
motive of the offeror and its predictable effect on the offerees, taking
into account their actual, not hypothetical, situation. 70
Another, and different, baseline problem arises if we look not at
each salesman's individual decision to accept or decline the early
retirement offer, but focus instead on the decision faced by all the
salesmen. Easterbrook notes that three salesmen did not take early
retirement and remained on the job, inferring that continued employment
was indeed an option.'' But just because it turned out that some
salesmen (n) could refuse the offer and remain employed, all could not.
That is, remaining employed depended on others not choosing to remain
employed, so the consent of all could not be uncoerced. G. A. Cohen has
described the circumstances in which not more than n can exercise the
freedom all have.' He uses as his example a locked room with 10
people each equi-distant from the single key which will unlock the door
that is the means of escape for one person only.'
Since the freedom of each is contingent on the others not exercising
their similarly contingent freedom, we can say that there is a great deal
of unfreedom in'their situation. Though each is individually free to
leave, he suffers with the rest from what I shall call collective

The offer in Henn took on added significance in the context of warnings that older employees were
not being effective. See Henn, 819 F.2d at 830. The observation of Easterbrook's colleague on the
Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, Richard Posner, is that:
[an offer of early retirement usually reflects a desire by the employer to reduce the
number or average age of its employees ....The employee knows this and knows,
therefore, that if he turns down an offer of early retirement today, he may be fired or laid
off tomorrow.... It might actually pay an employer to engage in outright age
discrimination from time to time to increase the incentive of older employees to elect
early retirement.
Richard A. Posner, Employment Discrimination:Age Discriminationand Sexual Harassment, 19
INT'LREV. L. &EcON. 421,431 (1999).
170. See FEINBERG, supra note 158, ch. 24 (Failures of Consent: Coercive Offers). It is an
empirical question whether employees offered generous benefits to quit their employment can ever
believe that they are entitled to remain. In Henn the invitation to leave was undisguised, as it usually
is with waivers-for-private-gain.
171. See Henn, 819 F.2d at 826.
172. See Cohen, supranote 158, at 180.
173. See id.
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unfreedom174

The concept of collective unfreedom challenges us to think about the
voluntariness of consent in a different way than Easterbrook does.
Within the structure created by the employer (and supported by the law),
each individual may consent voluntarily to remain, but not all salesmen
may do so. In assessing the coerciveness of the offer to retire, its
uncoerced refusal by some cannot mask others' coerced acceptance.
When we consider the salesmen collectively we see that none of the
acceptances of the offer of early retirement are sufficiently voluntary to
qualify as uncoerced.' 75
The baselines I have identified as relevant for determining
voluntariness are vulnerable to the following argument: the preferences
of the employees have no legal basis, that is, employees do not have the
right to secure employment either individually or as a group. And so,
according to this argument which uses what is called a moralized
concept of coercion, 176if an employee does not have a legal right to
something there can be no claim that his employer coerces him when the
employer does not give it to him. Just as I may forbid stranger and friend
alike from pitching a tent on the 100 acres of undeveloped property that
I own without coercing them, and call on the state to oust them as
trespassers, an employer may, again backed up by the enforcement
power of the state, withdraw capital from and close a business, thereby
depriving employees of jobs and income, without exercising any
coercion over them. In both circumstances, ownership by conferring
state-enforced authority to control and dispose precludes coercion. And
it matters not if the trespassers are homeless Mother Theresas or the
employees impoverished parents of ill children, because the legal
entitlement to property not only trumps claims based on preference,
sentiment, need or good deeds, but prevents its owner from coercing
others so long as the owner does not violate the legal rights of others."
The moralized concept of coercion, predicated on the legitimacy of
control of private property, makes sense to many people.'78 But it is just
174. Id. (emphasis in the original).
175. Or, using Cohen's language, n salesmen are able to exercise their freedom to remain
employed, only if all other salesmen recognize their unfreedom to remain employed. See id.
176. See WERTHEIMER, supra note 155, at 7-8; see also ROBERT NOzicK, ANARCHY, STATE,
AND UTOPIA 28-30 (1974).
177. See generally WERTHEIMER, supra note 155, at 242-58 (discussing the moralized concept
of coercion).
178. The standard references are NOZICK, supra note 176; and WERTHEIMER, supra note 155.
A concise summary of the nuances among philosophers appears in the modem classic, Kathleen M.
Sullivan, UnconstitutionalConditions, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1415, 1442-50 (1989).
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part of a theory, a way of looking at the world, and when subjected to
scrutiny perhaps a less than convincing one. Three observations should
suffice to, at the least, raise doubts about using rights to establish a
baseline for judging whether coercion has occurred in the employment
context. First, and obvious once it is pointed out: although the current
land owner or employer has legal title to her wealth, if we traced that
title back far enough we would find at some point the use of physical
force or fraud to capture the property which later generations acquire or
inherit "cleanly. '1 79 But, on the moralized account, how the employee or
employer came to their legal entitlements is irrelevant. Instead we take a
snapshot of their legal entitlements at the moment the offer is made. The
moralized baseline depends on each person's rights, but these rights
have no history, moral or otherwise. It is not self-evident why the history
of acquisition is not relevant to the question of who has wealth and who
does not, if wealth is a basis for having rights.
Second, ownership of property operates just like force and fraud in
increasing the cost of performing actions; we're simply not accustomed
to thinking about private property in this way. If someone makes me an
offer that raises the cost of my preferred action enough to stop me from
choosing to do it, my consent to his offer is not voluntary. This is easy to
see when physical force or fraud raises the cost, because force and fraud
are commonly thought to reduce voluntariness. However, when one
considers the effect private property has on raising the cost of actions,
property owners acting within their rights are generally not considered to
make the actions of those who do not own property sufficiently less
voluntary to count as coerced. 80
G. A. Cohen suggests that one reason for this asymmetrical
thinking is the tendency to confuse a social or legal constraint with an

179. See Robert L. Hale, Coercion and Distributionin a Supposedly Non-Coercive State, 38
POL. SCI. Q. 470, 472-73 (1923); BARBARA H. FRIED, THE PROGRESSIVE ASSAULT ON LAISSEZ
FAIRE: ROBERT HALE AND THE FIRST LAW AND ECONOMICS MOVEMENT ch. 3 (1998) (discussing

the intellectual influences on and around Hale); see also Frank H. Knight, Some Fallacies in the
Interpretationof Social Cost, 38 Q. J. ECON. 582, 591 (1924) ("Mhe original 'appropriation' of
such opportunities by private owners involves investment in exploration, in detailed investigation
and appraisal by trial and error of the findings, in development work of many kinds necessary to
secure and market a product-besides the cost of buying off or killing or driving off previous
claimants.").
180. This is not a new observation. See, e.g., JEREMY BENTHAM, PRINCIPLES OF THE CIVIL
CODE, pt. I,ch. 1, in 1 WORKS, pt. II, at 301-302 (1838); Robert L. Hale, Coercion and
Distribution,supra note 179, at 472-73; Robert Hale, Bargaining, Duress, and Economic Liberty,
43 COLUM. L REV. 603, 603-606 (1943). See generally Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., Privilege,
Malice and Intent, 8 HARVARD L. REV. 1 (1894) (discussing voluntary versus coerced action).
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immutable one.'8 ' He uses the example of humans being unable to fly
without major mechanical assistance; wingless-ness is part of the human
condition and not a social or legal constraint on flying.'82
Now I suggest that one explanation of [] theorists' failure to note that
private property constrains freedom is a tendency to take as part of the
structure of human existence in general, and therefore as no social or
legal constraint on freedom, any structure around which, merely as
things are, much of our activity is organized. A structure which is not a
permanent part of the human condition can be misperceived as being
just that, and the institution of private property is a case in point. It is
treated as so given that the obstacles it puts on freedom are not
perceived, while any impingement on private property itself is
immediately noticed. Yet private property, like any system of rights,
pretty well is a particular way of distributing freedom and
unfteedom.... To think83 of capitalism as a realm of freedom is to
overlook half its nature.
And, as Cohen notes, the more private property one has, the more
one understandably (if wrongly) considers the distribution of property to
be the natural way things are; a and thus one is led to ignore the
constraints that the lack of property makes people endure, when deciding
if their choices are coerced or voluntary. However, when an owner
closes her buggy whip business and uses the capital thus freed-up to
finance an internet enterprise, she certainly seems to make the choice of
her now-former employees to stop working for her involuntary. Buying
their consent to waive any past or present claims of statutory violations
in exchange for enhanced benefits does not change the basic situation of
involuntary unemployment.
The fundamental weakness in the moralized conception of coercion
that underlies Easterbrook's decision is its undefended (or underdefended) claim that no (coercive) action which a property owner has
the right to do diminishes the voluntariness of anyone else's act. But
181. See Cohen, supranote 158, at 169.
182. See id.
183. Id. at 169-70 (emphasis in the original). See also Jeffrey Reiman, Exploitation,Force, and
the Moral Assessment of Capitalism:Thoughts on Roemer and Cohen, 16 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 3, 1112 (1987) ("The force in capitalism is ... elusive .... This is because, unlike the masters of
classical slaves, capitalists are normally prohibited from using physical violence against their
workers either on the job or at the negotiating table. Consequently, that workers are forced to work
in order not to starve ...appears as no more than the natural fact that food doesn't fall from the sky
and thus people must work in order to eat... [I]n capitalism, overt force is supplanted by force
built into the very structure of the system of ownership and the classes defined by that system.").
184. See Cohen, supra note 158, at 170.
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when the employee must choose between unemployment with benefits
or without, or the applicant must choose no job or a job conditioned on

waiving the judicial forum, her choices certainly seem to be restricted.
Consent does not appear to be voluntary, even though the employer may
have the right to act as it did.
So the question of voluntariness is not automatically resolved by
establishing the presence or absence of a right, and this analytic
observation accords with our intuitions. Spotting two ten year-olds in the
park and observing that one sits on the grass enviously watching the

other ride a slick racing bike, we may realize that the bike rider is
privileged to use the bicycle because she owns it. We also know, or at

least may conclude without further inquiry, that the other child is not

"voluntarily" grass-bound. This being a hypothetical, we may assume
that our grass-bound child is an impoverished but expert racer. Our
conclusion is no different if the rider offers the grass-bound child the
opportunity to remain sitting on the grass for nothing (the status quo) or
offers the opportunity to ride the bike for an hour in exchange for a $100
payment. The decision to remain grass-bound does not seem voluntary
in the relevant sense. It is forced on the grass-bound child because she
lacks both the $100 to purchase an hour's ride and the funds to purchase

a bike of her own.
185. G. A. Cohen makes a further point, that the moralized theory of coercion seems to rely on
two inconsistent definitions of freedom-the normatively neutral account of freedom, which
recognizes decreases in freedom along with increases; and the rights-based account of freedom, in
which the normative judgment is made that those with rights are justified in forcing choices on
those without rights. The form of the argument, quoting Robert Nozick, is: "Other people's actions
place limits on one's available opportunities [(a normatively neutral account of freedom)]. Whether
this makes one's resulting action non-voluntary depends upon whether these others had the right to
act as they did [(a rights account of freedom)]." Cohen, supranote 158, at 170-71.
According to Cohen, the statement about other people's actions is consistent with the
normatively neutral account of freedom, which recognizes that protection of property rights
increases the freedom of owners but also decreases the freedom of non-owners. See id. at 171. The
statement that voluntariness depends on whether the others had the right to act as they did rejects
this normatively neutral account of freedom. Justified interference does reduce freedom; and control
of private property is justified interference. See id. Here we run into a problem: how does the
defender of the property owner know that use of private property to exclude is justified? Those
adopting the moralized definition of freedom seem to take it for granted that interference with
private property reduces freedom. See id. But, as we have seen, to explain the protection of private
property in terms of freedom necessarily entails recognition of the unfreedom of the property-less.
The proposition that interference with private property reduces freedom thus depends on the
normatively neutral definition of freedom. Yet to defend the proposition that the property owner is
justified in interfering with the choices of non-owners, proponents return to the rights definition of
freedom. "And so they go, back and forth, between inconsistent definitions of freedom, not because
they cannot make up their minds which one they like better, but under the propulsion of their desire
to occupy what is in fact an untenable position." Id. at 171-72. (I am told that Cohen misrepresents
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2. Beneficial Coercive Offers
This brings us to the second problem with Easterbrook's
formulation, the proposition that it does not matter if an act or promise is
forced as long as the offeree is left better off. Easterbrook states: "'Your
money or your life?' calls for a choice, but each option makes the
recipient worse off. When one option makes the recipient better off, and
the other is the status quo, then the offer is beneficial [and
noncoercive]. ' 't 6 That is, if A offers B something to which B is not
otherwise legally entitled in order to get B to take a legally permissible
action, B's decision to accept A's offer can never be coerced or
involuntary, and hence is unenforceable, because there is no unlawful
pressure of the sort that taints B's consent. This plausible account, which
distinguishes between coercive threats and noncoercive offers, finds
expression in many areas of the law, 87 and has currency in the
philosophical literature. 8 This account, though, is not self-evidently
correct and has been convincingly challenged. 9 If it is found faulty, we
must rethink whether, under certain conditions, consent induced by
economic necessity is sufficiently involuntary to excuse performance of
an act or promise.
Joel Feinberg offers a now-famous example that nicely illustrates
how a beneficial offer is nonetheless coercive and, as we shall see, the
analysis underlying the illustration applies in the employment context as
well. 9' A mother with a dying child is unable to afford the expensive
surgery that will save the child's life and has no loving family or friends
with deep pockets. A lecherous millionaire, learning of her plight and
finding the woman attractive, offers her sufficient funds to restore the
child's health, on the condition that the woman become his mistress for a
period of time. Should she decline the offer, the mother suffers no
additional penalty because her child would die anyway. Thus the
Nozick in this analysis; but colleagues who cite or agree with Nozick repeatedly rely on the shifting
and inconsistent definitions of freedom identified by Cohen.).
186. Henn v. Nat'l Geographic Soc'y, 819 F.2d 824, 826 (1987).
187. See generally WERTHEIMER, supra note 155, at Pt. 1 (discussing judicial decisions in
contract, tort and criminal law, and approving those which invalidate consent only in the face of
illegal threats). Interestingly Wertheimer posits a philosophical basis for upholding settlements of
lawsuits that implicitly relies on the parties' complete knowledge of the terms of the compromise.

See id. at 35.
188. See, e.g.,

NOZICK, supranote 176, at 90-91; WERTHEIMER, supra note 155, at 202-04.
189. See supra notes 139-41 and accompanying text.
190. See FEINBERG, supra note 158, at 232-33. Feinberg uses the terminology of "freedomenhancing coercive offers." I prefer the phrase "beneficial coercive offers," since the law tends to
speak in terms of increasing options rather than increasing freedom.
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mother's choice is between the status quo of watching her child die,
which is unthinkable, and submitting to the millionaire's desire which,
in any other circumstances, would be equally unthinkable. To some, the
mother's choice is "voluntary" and enforceable because the millionaire's
offer gives her the added option of a healthy child purchased by her
debasement instead of the sole consequence of a dead child. Yet,
describing the mother's decision to accept the millionaire's offer as
"voluntary" is hard to accept, because the millionaire's offer is intended
to and does have the effect of manipulating the mother to do the
millionaire's bidding. Thus, Feinberg posits, we have an example of a
beneficial coercive offer, an offer to which she consents involuntarily,
even though it may make her better off. 9'
To the claim that someone benefits from getting a new alternative,
and the choice of one or the other cannot be coerced, Feinberg responds:
A's purpose is to force B to do what A wants, so when thought of as an
instrument for achieving A's goals, his offer is an exercise of coercion.
From 13's standpoint, as we have seen, her only choice is a coerced
one-sleep with me or your child dies-so there is a real point in
characterizing A's offer as coercive. She must now do as he wishes.
Yet there is also a point in B's welcoming an option she did not have
before. Hence from B's standpoint, the description "freedomenhancing coercive offer" is entirely felicitious in having this double
point, and it is a small price to pay for this felicity to jettison the
dogma that enlarged freedom and specific coercion cannot coexist."2
Does Feinberg's formulation of beneficial, coercive offers help us
to understand whether waivers-for-private-gain should be enforced? The
choice between two evils is stark in the lecherous millionaire example,
but some may question whether the choice between having or not having
a job is as wrenching. Feinberg himself, however, having established the
analytic basis for the concept of a beneficial coercive offer elaborates
using an employment hypothetical as one illustration: A New York
employee is offered a position in Houston. 93 If the New York job is:

191. The coercion, thus, vitiates her consent, at least in an action in contract or tort, because we
are asking whether from the mother's perspective she believed she had a choice; on a criminal
charge of rape, the mother's consent would exonerate the defendant because we are asking what the
defendant believed at the time of the rape. See FEINBERG, supranote 158, at 262-68.
192. Id. at 233. Feinberg describes his approach as the "compatibilist" solution to the coercive
offer problem. Id.
193. See id.
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so odious that it is intolerable, no welfare payments are available to
him, and the Houston job, his sole alternative, is itself distasteful and
unrewarding though by far the lesser of the evils, then the offer has
crossed the threshold of coerciveness ....
[because] at least one of the
exclusive alternatives is thought to be in itself a very great evil, and not
merely a lesser good. 94

In these circumstances an offer between the status quo and modest
improvement qualifies as a beneficial coercive offer. The beneficial job
offer is coercive because it is an exclusive alternative to an intolerable
evil,'95 not simply a prospect that is much preferred.'96 Unemployment is,
of course, a greater evil than intolerable working conditions so an offer
of unemployment with benefits, even though it promises a modest
economic improvement over unemployment without benefits, crosses
the threshold of coerciveness."' Conditioning the receipt of benefits on
the waiver of enforcement of accrued statutory rights in no way lessens
the evil. Conditioning a job on agreement to use an arbitral forum to
resolve employment disputes similarly does not make the prospect of
unemployment any less intolerable.
A second possible objection to extending the concept of beneficial
coercive offers to waivers-for-private-gain is that the example of the
lecherous millionaire assumes there is no doubt about the child's
impending death and the millionaire's delivery on his promise, while in
the context of the employment relationship,' the offeree is not choosing
194. Id. at 234-35.
195. Note that Feinberg does not even consider no employment to be a realistic alternative.
Jeffrey Reiman usefully points out that in standard cases, like your money or your life, force is
understood as limiting people's options by making all their alternatives but one either unacceptable
or prohibitively costly; but with structural force people's options are limited to a range of things
they can do, with options outside the range either prohibitively costly or unacceptable. See Reiman,
supra note 183, at 14.
196. If the employee is content in his New York job and the Houston job is similarly attractive
but comes with a $30,000 raise, we do not have a coercive offer. Even if the Houston job carries
only a $3,000 raise to which the employee is indifferent, the offer is not coercive. For other
employment-related illustrations, see FEINBERG, supranote 158, at 257, 259.
197. As Feinberg elaborates;
What distinguishes coercive from noncoercive offers then is not only (1) the degree of
"differential coercive pressure," that is, the gap between the value tag of what is offered
and the price tag of what is required, but also (2) that at least one of the exclusive
alternatives is thought to be in itself a very great evil, and not merely a lesser good. It is
possible therefore to explain how the great run of offers are noncoercive (and freedomenhancing) while holding, nevertheless, that there can be some unusual offers that are
coercive (and freedom-enhancing). The latter are those that offer a prospect that is not
simply much preferred, but one which is an exclusive alternative to an intolerable evil.
FEINBERG, supra note 158, at 234-35.
198. For example, with waivers-for-private-gain, in which the employee agrees to forego civil
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between two certainties. To return to Henn, the fifteen members of the

sales force knew the plan was to eliminate some unspecified number of
older workers;' 99 they may have reasoned that if enough of the fifteen did
not accept the benefits package some salesmen would be terminated
without benefits; w and they did not know either how many needed to go
in order to secure the jobs of the remaining older salesmen, or which of
the fifteen, if any, would be retained."' But all knew that rejecting the
retirement benefits while remaining employed depended on acceptance

of the termination package by many others;m and all knew the difficulty,
perhaps impossibility, of salesmen over the age of fifty-five finding new
jobs.2 3 The calculation, thus, involves more than choices between
unacceptable alternatives; it requires reliance on the probable choices of
others and on the probability that the intolerable evil will occur. Does
the probabilistic nature of the evil reduce the coercive pressure on the
offerees in a way that affects the voluntariness of consent to participate
in the termination program? That depends on the probability. If the
probability of harm is high enough, there is no meaningful difference

from certainty that an intolerable evil will be experienced. And one need
not be seriously risk averse to conclude that employers do not make
lucrative termination offers to employees who are considered long-term
assets to the enterprise or that older workers are disfavored in the hiring

process.'
litigation in the future or to abandon past and current claims of statutory violations.
199. See Henn v. Nat'l Geographic Soc'y, 819 F.2d 824, 826 (1987).
200. See id.
201. See id.
202. Easterbrook points out that three salesmen who did not accept early retirement kept their
jobs. This fact enabled the court to pose the choice as between continuing employment or a
generous retirement package, ignoring that at the time each salesmen made his choice none of them
knew whether any of them would be retained. See Henn, 819 F.2d aat 826. Another possibility
ignored by Easterbrook is that among those electing early retirement were the best performing
salesmen, secure in the knowledge that they could find new employment, leaving the retained four
to await their inevitable performance-based terminations. Cf. McNab v. Gen. Motors Corp., 162
F.3d 959, 960 (7th Cir. 1998) (Easterbrook, J.) (allowing employer to not offer early retirement to
employees whose continued employment was "in GM's best interest"); Noorily v. Thomas & Betts
Corp., 188 F.3d 153, 158 (3d Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 529 U. S. 1053 (2000) (stating that ERISA
permits corporations to create welfare benefit plans, in this case a plan involving severance benefits,
that give employers wide discretion consistent with the corporation's business interests). Still
another possibility is that the employer kept on four of the salesmen to demonstrate that the
retirement offer was not a pretext to eliminate all salesmen over 55. See Posner, supra note 169, at
428-29 ("[A] firm that wants to get rid of an older employee can often do so with near impunity by
cashiering a younger employee at the same time. One hears rumors that this is a common
practice.").
203. See Henn, 819 F.2d at 826.
204. As applied to prospective waivers of the judicial forum, the probabilistic element is
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But even if Feinberg's formulation of beneficial coercive offers is
not accepted, there is another way to defend the position that waiversfor-private-gain may be coerced and should therefore be unenforceable.
While no employer is required to offer a job or enhanced benefits to
potential and incumbent employees, employment policies are
consciously set, and employers as a class establish the patterns. To some
extent, all employers are at least indirectly involved in determining the
status quo and the allowable conditions for escaping from that status
quo. Thus, it could be argued that employers as a class are active agents
in creating the dilemmas faced by employees asked to sign waivers-forprivate-gain. The lecherous millionaire, by contrast, is in no way
responsible for the desperate mother's dilemma and is not even remotely
associated with the conditions causing the mother's poverty or the
child's illness.
Even those philosophers who insist that offers cannot be coercive
unless they violate rights acknowledge that setting up a situation in
which one is able to exploit someone tends to vitiate consent, while
merely taking advantage of a situation for which one has no
responsibility does not. For example, David Zimmerman posits this
example of a coercive offer: B is kidnapped by A and brought to an
island where the only work available is in A's factory.2 5 All the jobs in
A's factory are far worse than those available to B on the mainland. A
proposes to B: "Take one of the jobs in my factory and I won't let you
starve." In contrast, Zimmerman contends, that if C also owns a factory
on the island and seeing B on the beach beats A to the scene and makes
the same kind of proposal, for work equally as odious as in A's factory,
C's offer is not coercive. 206
[O]nly A makes a coercive offer. The intuitive idea underlying
coercion is that the person who does the coercing undermines or limits
the freedom of the person who is coerced, so coercing goes beyond
exploiting [taking advantage of a situation one did not create], however
objectionable the latter may be."
reduced, since the choice to reject the employer's terms expressly entails recission of the job offer
or the promotion.
205. See David Zimmerman, Coercive Wage Offers, 10 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 133, 134 (1981).

206. See id.
207. Id. Joel Feinberg criticizes the distinction embraced by Zimmerman, noting that A doubly
wronged B: first, by creating the circumstances of B's vulnerability by reducing B's freedom, and
then through the coercive job offer; C, by contrast only issued a coercive offer. See FEINBERG,
supranote 158, at 244. Since we are concerned with the voluntariness of B's assent, the effect of the
offer is coercive in both cases and the intent of the offeror is coercive in either case.
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The employers who determine the terms on which employment or
benefits will be granted are, like A, arrangers not opportunists."'5
B. VoluntarinessReconsidered
It appears defensible, at the least, to view waivers-for-private-gain
as coercive. The form of the claim is: B does not act voluntarily
whenever others interfere with her actions, regardless of others' right to
interfere with them and regardless of whether B has the right to perform
her actions, where the interference causes and is intended to cause B to
take the action desired by others and the choice offered to B is an
exclusive alternative to an intolerable evil.
As applied to waivers-for-private gain, the form of the claim is:
Where, (i) employers manipulate the choices open to the employee in
order to have the employee take the action the employers want the
employee to take, and (ii) the choice of prospectively waiving statutory
rights and unemployment is an alternative to unemployment or
employment under intolerable conditions,
(a) an employee, choosing to quit with benefits and waive
enforcement of accrued statutory claims, consents to do so
involuntarily when employers raise the cost enough to stop her
from choosing to remain employed, whether or not the employee
has a legal entitlement to job security and whether or not
employers have the right to discharge employees; and
(b) an applicant for new employment or a promotion does not turn
down the position voluntarily when employers raise the cost of her
taking the position by conditioning the position on an agreement

208. Jeffrey Reiman reaches a similar result while insisting that:
we must free ourselves from the notion that force occurs only when a person is presented
with alternatives all of which are unacceptable except one. Otherwise, we shall miss the
way in which social structures force fates on people while appearing to leave their fates
up to them .... I contend that all a social structure has to do to count as forcing fates on
its members is to force them into an array of fates among which they will be distributed
or distribute themselves in some manner within the limits of tolerance necessary to the
functioning of that structure. This is all that is necessary, because, for the purpose of
moral assessment of social structures, what is crucial is how they constrain people's
lives, and that is so even if there is enough play in that constraint to allow a role for
choice.
Reiman, supranote 183, at 16-17.
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to use arbitration, rather than the judicial forum, to resolve future
employment disputes.
IV. CONCLUSION
A fundamental problem with enforcing waivers-for-private gain is
the inability of employees and applicants to assess the choices offered,
because there is no contemporaneous and concrete employment dispute
at the time the employees or applicants agree to forego litigation over
past and present claims or to submit future claims to arbitration. Courts
and legislatures refuse to excuse performance of these waivers on that
ground, however. Instead, a due process model is applied to test whether
in any given case a particular employee or applicant could have known
the meaning and consequences of the waiver in question. The issue of
voluntariness is ignored or subsumed under the question of how or
whether the employee had actual or constructive knowledge of the terms
of the waiver. This model is deficient because it ignores employers'
abilities to manipulate choices to secure assents to waivers-for-privategain. No matter how much time one is given to think about the options
and no matter how many consultations with lawyers, the underlying
facts do not change; and the employee or applicant must choose between
options none of which she prefers, but one of which she will accept to
avoid an even more egregious projected consequence. 2"
Courts and legislators utilize a due process model in good faith,
laboring under a misunderstanding of the criteria for finding the waivers
to be voluntary or uncoerced. In addition, they lose sight of the
significant statutory rights being waived and see only an agreement
between two parties. In this way the law of contracts regains its hold
over the regulation of employment disputes. But contracts in the
employment relationship are not the equivalent of commercial contracts;
and the rules for enforcing commercial contracts ought not be imposed
on waivers-for-private-gain. If contract doctrine is appropriate in the
employment context then the "peppercorn" of common law lore, which
is sufficient to function as consideration in the commercial context, will,
in employment cases, become a $5 signing bonus for waiving the right
to challengd statutory violations in court. 20

209. In some circumstances, an employee may be able to negotiate a better deal than the one
offered. But that is the rare case. Even more rare is the ability of a group of employees to negotiate a
better deal for themselves, in the absence of a union.
210. In Blumrosen, supra note 33, at 1011-14, the authors propose that the judiciary inquire
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The philosophical understanding of coercion quite clearly
repudiates reliance on procedural regularity to assess the voluntariness
of waivers-for-private-gain. But because it does not draw clear, bright

lines, the philosophical understanding of coercion may cause unease
among employers, judges, lawyers and commentators. I want, however,

to suggest that we not turn away from adopting a sophisticated
understanding of coercion just because its application may at times be
messy. The law of employment relations, long held captive by contracts,

should not be filtered through the common law. Instead, let us
acknowledge the actual experiences of employees "with little, if any

bargaining power,"" ' and the market imperfections that require
correction through statutory regulation, and proceed to use the
philosophical understanding of coercion to aid in assessing the
voluntariness of waivers-for-private-gain. For the vast majority of

prospective and incumbent employees, shopping for a flexible employer
is not a simple matter, nor is it likely that the diligent applicant will find
many options. In employment, as in most areas of law, standardized
into the voluntariness of waivers of accrued statutory violations by evaluating the compensation
offered to the employee. In essence, the authors invite the judiciary to develop a common law of
proportionality in assessing acceptances of severance benefits in exchange for waivers of accrued
claims. Using this approach, the agreement of our terminated female employee who earns $30,000
to waive accrued claims in exchange for $100,000 would certainly be deemed voluntary and
enforceable. It is unclear whether industry practice, two weeks of pay for each year of service,
would purchase a valid waiver under this approach.
211. Barrentine v. Ark.-Best Freight Sys., 450 U.S. 728, 735 (1981). See also RICHARD B.
FREEMAN & JOEL ROGERS, WHAT WORKERS WANT 7 (1999) (The vast majority of workers would
prefer an alternative dispute resolution system over going to court but they "do not want firms to be
allowed to require that workers forgo their rights to legal redress in favor of company-instituted
arbitration systems as a condition for employment"). Furthermore, three-fourths of the participants
in the study said that it should be illegal for an employer to insist that employees relinquish their
right to go to court as a precondition for getting a job. See id. at 135. The study included focus
group discussions with fifty-six workers in six occupational groups; twenty-six minute national
surveys of 2,308 employees; fifteen-minute follow-up surveys of 801 respondents to the earlier
survey; ten-minute surveys of 1,000 respondents; and additional surveys to 1,002 public-sector
employees, 1,100 Canadian employees, and 1,000 British employees. See id. at 37. As Lorene D.
Park has observed:
The implications of this expectation are two-fold. First, it indicates that when employees
agree, before a dispute even arises, to submit any claims to an arbitral forum that it is not
just the judicial forum that they are giving up but it is also the right to choose after a
dispute arises, which in and of itself has value and should be only [ exchanged for
adequate consideration. Second, it indicates that if there is no written contract, and
therefore no particularized expression of what an at-will employee actually and
legitimately expects, the default position should not be that the employee expects
whatever the employer unilaterally offers. Employees already have a baseline
expectation that they can go to court for serious disputes and above that... Congress
provided an expectation of the right to a jury trial.
Park, supranote 97.
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forms and policies prevail. For most employees, most of the time, firmspecific investments may make exit impossible. This reality, rather than
a spurious analogy to the circumstances in which commercial contracts
are made, is the appropriate and fair basis for inquiring into the
voluntariness of agreeing to collateral matters when employees decide
whether to accept jobs, promotions, bonuses or transfers.
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